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LEAGUE STRUCTURE & STADIUM RENT-SEEKING—THE ROLE 
OF ANTITRUST REVISITED 
David Haddock, Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag
*
 
―O wad some Power the giftie gie us‖† 
Abstract 
Professional North American sporting teams receive enormous 
public funding for new and renovated stadiums after threatening to 
depart their hometowns, or by actually moving elsewhere. In contrast, 
English sporting teams neither receive much public money for such 
projects, nor move towns. This Article argues that no inherent cultural 
or political transatlantic variations cause the differences; rather, it is the 
industrial organization of sports in the two countries—the structure of 
league control—that enables rent-seeking by American teams but not by 
their English counterparts. Cross-country time series data contrasting 
American professional football and baseball stadiums with English 
soccer grounds support our claim, as does data contrasting the stadiums 
of geographically flexible National Football League teams with those of 
functionally immobile major collegiate football teams. 
North American sports leagues are cartels: they control entry of 
teams, then collaborate to maximize effective rent-seeking, stave off 
competition, and keep prices high. In most of the world, competitive 
merit determines entrance into leagues via a system known as 
promotion and relegation, which demotes the worst performing teams in 
one competitive tier to the next lower tier at season‘s end, 
simultaneously promoting an equivalent number of top teams from the 
division below. The fluidity created by promotion and relegation 
severely undermines the credibility of a team‘s threat to leave town by 
creating alternative, less costly entry points into the league. Open entry 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor, Northwestern University School of Law & Department of Economics; 
Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Associate Professor, Loyola University 
Chicago and Visiting Fellow at Northwestern‘s Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and 
Economic Growth. Versions of this article were presented at the Searle Center‘s Fourth Annual 
Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy (2011), the Midwest Political 
Science Association Annual Conference (2012), the Marquette University School of Law 
Intellectual Property Colloquium (2012), the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law IP Speaker 
Series (2012), the Robert A. Levy Workshop at George Mason University (2012), and the 
European Association for Law & Economics (2012). Thanks to Charlotte Crane, Laura E. 
Evans, Jerry Hausmann, Matthew Mitten, John McGinnis, Ryan Sachs, Spencer Waller, the 
faculty of Northwestern Law School for comments, and to Kelli Rucker for research. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge a generous grant from the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, 
and Economic Growth. 
 † Robert Burns, To a Louse (1786). 
1
Haddock et al.:  League Structure &Stadium Rent Seeking— the Role of Antitrust Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
2 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
mitigates pressure to engage in intercity competition over scarce team 
slots, and thus relieves the pressure to transfer wealth from public 
taxpayers to private team owners through stadium funding.  
Stadium rent-seeking illustrates a weakness of antitrust law in 
remedying problems at the intersection of market and political 
organization. The anticompetitive structure of American leagues 
provides the platform for stadium rent-seeking, but the resulting harm is 
arguably a political injury rather than an antitrust offense. Nonetheless, 
this Article argues that finding a way to impose a promotion and 
relegation system would be the least intrusive means for the United 
States and Canada to limit sporting league cartel behavior to its proper 
functions, such as arranging schedules and defining uniform rules. The 
unpromising solution under antitrust law makes it all the more 
imperative for Congress to address this costly injury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The median family home in the United States is about thirty-seven 
years old
1
 but Major League Baseball (MLB) and National Football 
League (NFL) stadiums average less than twenty-three years of age.
2
 
Several times a decade a completely new edifice, often in a city over a 
thousand miles away, supplants some team‘s relatively new stadium. 
Governments at various levels invest heavily in stadiums for wealthy 
professional franchises. 
In stark contrast, this season the mean age of playing grounds in 
arguably the world‘s top soccer league, the English Premier League, 
exceeds seventy-eight years. The contrast between Premier League and 
American stadium ages seems quite odd given the similar 
configurations and functional interchangeability of soccer and American 
football fields.
3
 Stadium age is not the only transatlantic difference: 
English soccer teams in every competitive tier renovate frequently but 
rarely build an entirely new stadium, wealthy upper tier teams typically 
bear much or all construction and renovation cost, and English teams 
almost never abandon their hometowns. 
This Article argues that neither cultural nor political transatlantic 
differences are responsible for this disparity; instead, a difference in the 
organization of sports—the structure of entry control—facilitates rent-
seeking by North American teams that is unavailing for their English 
counterparts.
4
 
Top tier American teams use their respective leagues as cartels: 
impeding entry by potential competitors (whether the competitors be 
teams or entire leagues), collaborating when seeking government 
handouts, and keeping quantity low and prices high. To avoid costly 
formation of an entire league, a would-be sporting franchise must obtain 
the approval of the existing teams acting jointly through their league; 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009 
1 tbl.1-1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/h150-09.pdf. 
 2. See infra Figure 1. 
 3. The 1994 Men‘s Soccer World Cup, hosted by the United States, used professional 
and collegiate football stadiums exclusively. See 1994 FIFA World Cup, U.S. SOCCER, 
http://www.ussoccer.com/About/History/US-Soccer-as-Host/1994-FIFA-World-Cup.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2012). American rules football games played in England, including an annual 
NFL game at London‘s Wembley Stadium, use soccer stadiums exclusively. See, e.g., NFL in 
the UK, NFL LONDON, http://www.nfllondon.net/history.html (last visited Sep. 31, 2012). 
 4. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate leagues, as does Wales to some degree, 
so the reader must not think us careless when we speak not of Britain but of England. Similarly, 
though Canada has a separate professional football league, with the exception of the NFL all the 
major leagues with U.S. teams also have Canadian teams, so we refer collectively to (North) 
American teams, leagues, and governments, using U.S. only if the context is inapplicable to 
Canada. 
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such acquiescence comes rarely and at a very high price. The difficulty 
an American challenger has entering the industry without entering the 
incumbent league gives incumbents a credible threat to withhold or 
withdraw all representation from cities that refuse to absorb much or all 
of the cost of cutting-edge facilities. Not only can a franchise leave, but 
it can also be confident that no new team will soon replace it; therein 
lies the heart of its negotiating power.
5
 
Los Angeles reveals a glaring example of stadium rent-seeking. In 
1961 the Chargers moved to San Diego, then in 1995 the Rams moved 
to St. Louis and the Raiders to Oakland. Each of those teams relocated 
to a newer, publically financed stadium in a much smaller city.
6
 
Henceforth, the second most populous Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (SMSA) in the United States
7
 has lacked an NFL team. That is 
seventeen years and counting. It is noteworthy that the Raiders initially 
arrived in Los Angeles only because Oakland refused to update its 
stadium as the team demanded, then returned north when L.A. likewise 
proved intransigent and Oakland saw the error of its ways. Now, the 
Chargers, Rams, and Raiders are among teams thought most likely to 
relocate to Los Angeles—but only if local government contributes 
heavily toward a new stadium.
8
  
Regardless of the sport—soccer, basketball, ice hockey, or others 
rarely played in America—in most of the world, entrance into leagues 
opens annually. A team earns or loses its place based on competitive 
merit via a system known as ―promotion and relegation.‖ The system 
demotes the worst performing teams in one competitive tier to the next 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Departing teams have been replaced, but, as exampled by the Cleveland Browns, only 
after the losing city agreed to substantial new subsidies. See Aaron Kuriloff & Darrell Preston, 
In Stadium Building Spree, U.S. Taxpayers Lose $4 Billion, BLOOMBERG, (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:03 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/in-stadiu m-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers-
lose-4-billion.html (―To land an expansion team in 1998, Cleveland provided a $315 million 
publicly financed building.‖). 
 6. Taxpayers assumed liability in one way or another for $60 million and $26 million 
dollars of renovations at Qualcomm Stadium for the Chargers and the Oakland Arena for the 
Raiders, respectively. The taxpayer bill for the Rams‘ new stadium in St. Louis was $290 
million. See Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship Between Major League 
Sports and Government, 339 POL‘Y ANALYSIS 1, 14–15 tbl.1 (1999). 
 7. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF INCORPORATED PLACES: APRIL 1, 
2010 TO JULY 1, 2011 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2011/ 
files/SUB-EST2011-IP.csvhttp://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2011/files/SUB-
EST2011-IP.csv. 
 8. See Arash Markazi, LA has tentative stadium agreement, ESPN.COM (Jul. 26, 2011, 
3:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nfl/story/_/id/6801664/city-reveals-tentative-agreeme 
nt-la-stadium. Jacksonville is another potential mover, but Minnesota lost interest recently after 
recently successfully using the threat to pressure its host government for a third new stadium 
since the team‘s formation in 1960. See id. 
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lower tier at season‘s end, replacing them with an equivalent number of 
top teams from the division below. Promotion and relegation has been 
standard in upper tier English soccer since 1898, right after the merger 
of the Football League with the Football Alliance.
9
 The system enables 
a team to improve its position unilaterally through skillful performance, 
which correlates with host city wealth, population, and preferences—in 
other words, the team‘s ability to generate adequate revenue. Promotion 
and relegation‘s fluidity creates alternative entry points for teams 
anxious to represent the locality, thus undermining the credibility of a 
team‘s threat to leave and mitigating pressure for intercity competition.  
The literature on stadium rent-seeking overwhelmingly concludes 
that the practice is harmful in numerous ways.
10
 Premature replacement 
of stadiums is expensive, wasteful of scarce public resources (diverting 
money from alternative infrastructure such as hospitals and roads), and 
seldom leads to the positive economic and cultural benefits that 
advocates routinely tout.  
Some commentators focus on the fact that American leagues permit 
teams to move as the root cause of stadium rent-seeking, but that 
analysis confuses cause and effect; the ready availability of rent-seeking 
gains incentivizes leagues to permit team movement. Others see the 
problem as rooted in avid public interest in sport or the failings of the 
political system. This Article contends that the problem is broader than 
simple team movement, enthusiasm for sports, or the weaknesses of 
politicians; the problem is that league structure vests entry control in the 
hands of incumbents. This Article supports that claim with cross-
country data contrasting American professional football and baseball 
stadiums with English soccer grounds, and also by comparing stadiums 
of footloose NFL teams with those of functionally immobile major 
collegiate football teams. 
Given the evidence that stadium rent-seeking is a product of closed 
league structures, the corresponding solution would seem to be some 
kind of structural remedy. This Article argues that imposition of 
promotion and relegation would be the least intrusive means for the 
U.S. and Canadian national governments to shield local governments 
from league abuses, thus limiting cartel behavior to legitimate functions, 
such as arranging schedules and defining uniform rules.
11
 For over a 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See History of the Football League, THE FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://www.football-league.co.uk/page/History/HistoryDetail/0,,10794~1357277,00.html.  
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. Ross and Szymanski, Noll, and Cain and Haddock have also discussed how the lack of 
a promotion and relegation system contributes to the stadium rent seeking phenomenon in North 
America, although without our data and mode of analysis. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan 
Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (arguing 
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century, aggrieved plaintiffs and government enforcement agencies 
have looked to antitrust law (competition law in the rest of the world) to 
right anticompetitive wrongs such as price fixing and cartelization. 
However, it is unclear whether current antitrust law can provide any 
remedy to the American stadium rent-seeking problem—but not for the 
reasons conventionally assumed. The decision to operate as a closed 
league presents an obvious structural impediment to competition. 
League cartels make new entry all but impossible and thus provide 
franchises with extraordinary leverage over cities to negotiate for ever 
greater subsidies. This closed structure hides in plain sight, obscured by 
the belief that there is no workable way to have a sporting league 
without it. Although producing a sporting competition does require 
cooperation with respect to certain features—such as rules, uniforms, 
equipment, league size, and competition schedule—the promotion and 
relegation system common throughout most of the world shows that the 
essentials of cooperation are compatible with freedom of entry. 
Obviously, once a schedule of matches is determined for a season, the 
league must exclude outsiders temporarily—but this is no justification 
for a cartel structure that endures across seasons. 
Running a permanently closed shop is an optional feature designed 
to benefit incumbents and not in any way essential to maintaining a 
sporting league. Thus, aspects of league behavior toward their host 
cities that depend on a permanently closed shop may violate the first 
mandate of antitrust law, § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits 
unreasonable agreements between competitors to restrain trade.
12
 
Because existing teams determine whether new entry will be allowed, a 
threat by an individual team to relocate may comprise an implicit threat 
of a concerted boycott. However, courts have proven reluctant to use 
antitrust law to address competition problems at the intersection of 
political and market structures. They may take the view that, although 
stadium rent-seeking results from the closed market structure of 
sporting leagues, the matter nonetheless concerns a political rather than 
a market injury. Likewise, we also anticipate that at the remedy stage 
                                                                                                                     
promotion and relegation would ―raise consumer welfare by increasing effective competition 
among the teams in [the] league‖ and undermine the existing potential for abuse of market 
power); Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The 
Case of English Football, 3 J. SPORTS ECON. 169, 175–77 (2002) (noting that the lack of 
promotion and relegation contributes to rent seeking in North America); Louis P. Cain & David 
D. Haddock, Similar Economic Histories, Different Industrial Structures: Transatlantic 
Contrasts in the Evolution of Professional Sports Leagues, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 1116, 1127–30 
(2005) (describing the divergence in power between English and American leagues arising due 
to the open entrance created by a promotion and relegation system in the former and not the 
latter). 
 12. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). 
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courts would be reluctant to try to determine the best way to transition 
from current league cartels to a system of open competition through 
promotion and relegation.  
This Article argues, however, that the same factors that make 
judicial intervention unlikely make it apparent that Congress should 
take steps to correct a distorted market structure. Although it is not the 
only potential solution, adopting a system of open competition through 
promotion and relegation would address the problem and leave sports 
otherwise free from unnecessary government interference, restructuring 
incumbent incentives rather than directly interfering with team and 
league management.  
The key to addressing stadium rent-seeking is to identify its causes 
and consider solutions that address those causes. Accordingly, this 
Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses more fully the nature of the 
American problem and its contrast with England. Part II considers the 
causes: demand—the public choice problems that exaggerate a city‘s 
inelastic demand for local league representation; supply—comparing 
the closed system of American leagues with the freedom of entry 
created by a promotion and relegation system; and free movement—
contrasting team incentive and ability to move in America with the 
derived incentive for loyalty in England. Part III examines the role that 
antitrust law could play in addressing the anticompetitive organization 
of sporting leagues. It explains why current antitrust law may not offer a 
complete solution to the problem and why the legislative imposition of a 
system of promotion and relegation may be preferable to court ordered 
remedies.  
I.  PUBLIC SPENDING FOR PRIVATE BENEFIT 
American governments spend astonishing sums constructing new 
sporting facilities for private professional sports teams. Between 1970 
and the end of 1999, the tally in the United States was $10.4 billion.
13
 
Public subsidies for stadium renovation over the same period amounted 
to a further $1.4 billion.
14
 The NFL alone has commanded public 
stadium subsidies of at least $2.4 billion since 2001.
15
 As the studies 
discussed below show, despite promoters‘ rationalizations to the 
contrary, subsidies are nearly entirely a wealth transfer from the general 
public—and certainly not merely or even predominantly from sports 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their 
Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 96 tbl.1 (2000) (summarizing data in Keating, supra note 
6, at 11–15.). These figures are in 1997 dollars. By decade, the figures break down to $5.10 
million, $1.58 million and $3.75 million for in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively. See id. 
 14. See id.  
 15. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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fans—to a select group of private franchises and their players. A few 
examples are informative. 
Estimates indicate that taxpayers will bear more than half of the 
cost, $1.19 billion, of the New Yankee Stadium that opened in the 
Bronx in 2009.
16
 A taxpayer burden of $1.19 billion amounts to nearly 
$200 per family living in the tristate New York City SMSA, or $500 per 
family within the city itself. Given the choice, how many of those 
families would have volunteered such a contribution to the third most 
valuable sports team in the world?
17
 Being evenhanded, taxpayers 
simultaneously forked over an additional $614 million of the $831 
million cost of a new stadium for the crosstown Mets,
18
 bringing the 
ratios to $300 per family in the SMSA and nearly $700 in the city. The 
public‘s largesse is unreciprocated. Yankee fans now pay 39% more on 
average for standard tickets,
19
 and there are fewer of them available to 
boot.
20
 By revealed preference, the combination of fewer seats at higher 
prices must make sense from the teams‘ perspectives, but is 
incongruous given the projects‘ massive public subsidies.  
A further incongruity is the demolition of so much recently built or 
refurbished infrastructure. Milwaukee built the first completely new 
publicly funded stadium intended solely as a professional baseball field, 
attracting the Braves away from Boston upon completion in 1953.
21
 
                                                                                                                     
 16. The remaining $1.123 million was privately financed. See Neil Demause, 
Private/Public Cost Breakdown For New Yankees/Mets Stadiums, FIELDOFSCHEMES.COM (Jan. 
2009), http://www.fieldofschemes.com/documents/Yanks-Mets-costs.pdf. 
 17. Manchester United is the world‘s most valuable team, worth $1.835 billion, followed 
closely by the Dallas Cowboys at $1.65 billion and the New York Yankees at $1.6 billion. See 
Michael K. Ozanian & Kurt Badenhausen, SportsMoney 50-50: The World‘s Most Powerful 
Teams and Athletes, FORBES.COM (Jul. 22, 2010, 6:40 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0809/sports-tiger-woods-kobe-bryant-floyd-mayweather-
50-50_2.html. 
 18. Raymond J. Keating, The Sporting Fellow: Old-Time Brooklyn in Queens, LONG 
ISLAND SENTINEL (Jul. 13, 2009), http://longislandsentinelsports.blogspot.com/2009/07/sporting-
fellow-old-time-brooklyn-in.html. 
 19. See Victor Matheson & Brad R. Humphreys, PILOTs and Public Policy: Steering 
Through the Economic Ramifications, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 280 (2009). 
 20. The new stadium‘s seating capacity is 50,287, whereas at abandonment the old 
stadium could seat 56,936. The Yankees had sold more than 70,000 tickets for some games prior 
to an earlier publically supported renovation. See Stadium Comparison, NEW YORK YANKEES, 
http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/nyy/ballpark/new_stadium_comparison.jsphttp://newyork.yank
ees.mlb.com/nyy/ballpark/new_stadium_comparison.jsp (last visited Sept. 15, 2012); Yankee 
Stadium, BALLPARKS.COM, http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/american/yankee.htm (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2008). 
 21. Baltimore built Venable Stadium at public expense in 1922. Venable sometimes 
served as a neutral venue for collegiate football games such as Army–Navy. No professional 
team used it until 1944 when the city‘s International League baseball Orioles lost its playing 
field to fire. Renamed Memorial Stadium after World War II, the stadium was rebuilt during 
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During the first season, the team set a National League attendance 
record. Following the 1966 season, however, the Braves left for a still 
newer stadium in Atlanta. County Stadium was nearly abandoned then, 
but received a reprieve when the expansion franchise in Seattle, 
dissatisfied with its stadium, moved to Milwaukee two years later—but 
today none of those stadiums remains standing.
22
  
Kansas City and Milwaukee had been rivals in the minor American 
Association. In 1955, Kansas City followed Milwaukee‘s lead, 
replacing its minor league stadium in haste and at substantially 
enhanced cost after the Athletics made a firm but contingent 
commitment to move from Philadelphia.
23
 As had happened with the 
Braves sojourn in Milwaukee, the stay was brief. The team was enticed 
away thirteen years later by Oakland‘s new stadium. Following a brief 
interlude—coupled with a Missouri Senator‘s threat to initiate a 
Congressional attack on baseball‘s privileged antitrust status24—a new 
expansion team used K.C.‘s Municipal Stadium for an additional four 
years.
25
 American professional sports teams do not like hand-me-
downs, however, so the city replaced the eighteen-year-old stadium with 
a new one.
26
  
What is so very striking about these examples is not merely the 
destruction of new stadiums, but that teams are often able to convince 
local politicians that their facility is obsolete before the government has 
even finished paying for it. New Jersey, for example, still owed about 
$110 million when they tore down thirty-three-year-old Giants Stadium 
to make way for New Meadowlands Stadium.
27
 Likewise, in 2010, 
taxpayers still owed more than $80 million for the Kingdome that 
                                                                                                                     
1949 and 1950 for use by the Colts of the All American Football Conference and by the Orioles. 
The Colts folded after using the stadium for one season, though an NFL expansion team of the 
same name reoccupied the field in 1953. The St. Louis Browns moved to Baltimore in 1954, 
evicting the minor league baseball team from both its field and its name. 
 22. See Andrew Clem, (Milwaukee) County Stadium, CLEM‘S BASEBALL BLOG, 
http://www.andrewclem.com/Baseball/MilwaukeeCountyStadium.html (last updated Feb. 28, 
2011, 10:45 PM). 
 23. Round the clock construction took only ninety days. See John Peterson, History of the 
A‘s, KANSAS CITY BASEBALL HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://kansascitybaseballhistoricalsociety 
.com/jan%20article.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
 24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuart_Symington under ―Other Issues‖ 
 25. Kansas City Sports Stadiums, Arenas and Ballparks History, ALL STARR SPORTS ZONE 
(Feb. 18, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.allstarrsports.com/index.php/kansas-city-sports/95-
kansas-city-sports-stadiums. 
 26. See Kauffman Stadium: The History of Kauffman Stadium, KANSAS CITY ROYALS, 
http://kansascity.royals.mlb.com/kc/ballpark/history.jsp (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
 27. Ken Belson, As Stadiums Vanish, Their Debt Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/sports/08stadium.html?pagewanted=allhttp:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/sports/08stadium.html?pagewanted=all.  
9
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Seattle opened in 1976 but razed in 2000.
28
  
While discussing an early draft of this article, a professor living in 
Boston pointed to the Patriots, Celtics, and Bruins as constituting 
exceptions in the U.S. system, claiming that they had paid for their own 
stadiums.
29
 Exceptions to the rule of stadium rent-seeking do not 
disprove the phenomenon—there is always going to be a distribution of 
success in teams‘ rent-seeking abilities. Moreover, the so-called 
exceptions are in fact quite misleading. Many forms of public stadium 
subsidization are not immediately apparent to casual observers, so the 
actual magnitude of subsidy is opaque. As such, it often appears that 
teams have paid their own way though they have not.  
Public subsidies come in a complex variety of forms that obscures 
their true cost: free land, free rent, publicly funded construction, 
renovation, and infrastructure, the assumption of debts, tax exemptions 
for creditors receiving interest on bonds, and property and sales tax 
exemptions are common features, whereas straight cash payments are 
rare.
30
 The complexity of stadium financing is an important ingredient 
of the public choice dynamic that allows for such massive wealth 
transfers from taxpayers to private for-profit franchises for four reasons.  
First, wealth transfers in the form of publicly financed stadiums are 
advantageous because, while cash is obviously a gift, a new or 
renovated stadium can be labeled as an infrastructure investment. The 
notion that building a public stadium for a primarily private use is an 
investment is assisted by the fact that stadiums are one of the few forms 
of infrastructure that actually produce revenue streams. As such, they 
can be made to appear on paper as if they are investments rather than 
transfers of wealth, even if the city is investing far more money than it 
ever expects to receive in revenue from concession stands, license fees, 
and other sources.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. Discussant comment at the Searle Center‘s Fourth Annual Conference on Antitrust 
Economics and Competition Policy (2011). 
 30. See generally Judith Grant Long, Full Count: The Real Cost of Public Funding for 
Major League Sports Facilities, 6 J. SPORTS ECON. 119 (2005); Ross D. Weiner, Financing 
Techniques and Stadium Subsidies in the United States, 11 J. URB. TECH. 41 (2004). For 
example, the State of Missouri and the City of St. Louis assumed the Rams‘ $30 million debt to 
the City of Anaheim to secure the team‘s move to St. Louis. The Rams were also given $15 
million to cover relocation expenses. Likewise Montreal and the Province of Quebec gave the 
Expos‘ new owners $33 million in 1990 to help them buy a team that moved to Washington 
fifteen years later. Remarkably, New York City actually paid the Yankees $10,000 to play in 
Yankee Stadium in 1977 because the stadium lease allowed the team to deduct maintenance 
costs from the rent. See Nathan R. Scott, Take Us Back to the Ball Game: The Laws and Policy 
of Professional Sports Ticket Prices, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 46–48 & nn.61–62 (2005).  
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Second, cities are not required to account for public construction 
spending and tax exemptions in the same way as cash. Notably, the 
commonly used Tax Increment Financing (TIF) makes large sums of 
money available to mayors as an economic development tool that would 
allow spending on stadium development, but not allow simple cash 
transfers. TIFs allow governments to spend future gains in taxes to 
finance current improvements, which will, theoretically, create those 
future gains. Note, however, that when these gains fail to materialize, 
TIFs are no more than a public to private transfer of wealth.
31
 For 
example, critics charge that $700 million of the $1.7 billion dollars 
spent through TIFs in Chicago in the last eight years went to private 
developers, and amounted to ―little more than a slush fund for [the 
mayor] to subsidize corporate Chicago at the public‘s expense.‖32 
Third, many stadium construction projects are financed with tax 
exempt municipal bonds. This effectively allows local decision makers 
to spend federal money on infrastructure such as stadium building. Thus 
subtly, a nontrivial part of the burden of replacing ―The House That 
Ruth Built‖ and similar structures will be borne by people who live 
thousands of miles away. A 1996 Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report shows that even those stadiums ostensibly built with 
private funds receive substantial aid from their tax-exempt bond 
status.
33
 Holding the overall size of government constant, other taxes 
have to be higher in compensation because interest payments to holders 
of municipal and state bonds are taxed less. The CRS estimated that a 
$225 million stadium built in 1996 and financed entirely with tax-
exempt bonds would receive a federal subsidy as great as $75 million 
over its life.
34
 According to the CRS, the federal tax subsidy for sports 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Note that increases in tax revenues attributable to inflation and demographic shifts can 
be used to make TIFs appear more effective than they are in reality. 
 32. Juan-Pablo Velez, TIF Aided Public and Private Projects Almost Evenly, Analysis 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/07cnctif.html?_r=1&pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytime
s.com/2011/08/07/us/07cnctif.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
 33. When a state sells stadium bonds they pay below market interest rates because the 
interest earnings are exempt from federal tax. In most states, bonds issued by a city are exempt 
from state taxes as well. Matthew J. Mitten and Bruce W. Burton summarize the findings of the 
CRS Report as follows: ―[T]he federal government loses millions of dollars in tax revenues 
without generating any net economic benefits to the nation as a whole . . . . Moreover, federal 
taxpayers‘ revenue loss usually exceeds the value of stadium bond interest savings to state or 
local taxpayers . . . .‖ Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise 
Relocations From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace 
Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 
144–45 (1997).  
 34. See DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 
AND THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS 9–13 & tbl.2 (1996); Adam Safir, 
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stadiums was $146 million in 1989 alone.
35
 Moreover, local taxpayers 
are left with the responsibility to repay the bonds if (inevitably when) 
the stadium fails to generate the expected revenues. 
Finally, in the rent-seeking game, complexity is a virtue in itself—
the complexity of stadium financing enables the public choice dynamic 
by obscuring the true net cost. The ambiguous cost of subsidies, loan 
guarantees, tax breaks, and free infrastructure can be difficult to 
calculate, as are the offsetting gains. Thus, byzantine mechanisms of 
stadium funding are far less accountable than cash—and far more 
attractive to politicians. 
The problem with the subsidies is not that stadiums confer no 
benefit on the community; the problem is that benefits are apparent 
whereas many costs are hidden. What is needed when evaluating 
infrastructure projects is not ―benefit analysis,‖ however, but ―cost–
benefit analysis.‖ It is not enough to point out that a new stadium will 
have some positive spillovers; a coherent argument that a stadium 
merits subsidy requires evidence both that the positive spillovers 
outweigh negative ones and that the net is what James Buchanan and 
William Craig Stubblebine have branded a ―relevant externality.‖36 The 
willingness of English soccer teams to finance their own stadium 
construction and renovation demonstrates that such projects create 
substantial private benefits and thus do not require public aid. If the 
private benefits of a new stadium exceed the private cost, then no public 
subsidy is required regardless of any positive spillovers that might 
accrue. To illustrate, a home owner who plants a garden for her own 
enjoyment may confer benefits upon those who look at it, she may even 
increase the value of surrounding property, but if her private incentives 
were sufficient to plant the garden without public subsidy, the 
externality is positive in total but nonexistent at the margin.
37
 
The empirical literature overwhelmingly concludes that the long-
term public cost of stadium construction overshadows the public 
benefits.
38
 Public funds ploughed into new and rejuvenated stadiums 
typically are justified as conferring gains to city reputation, prestige, 
                                                                                                                     
Note, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Politics of Financing Sports Stadium Construction, 
13 J.L. & POL. 937, 941 (1997). 
 35. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 34, at 7. For the public choice implications of the complexity 
of stadium financing, see infra Section II.A and accompanying text. 
 36. See James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371, 
373–84 (1962). 
 37. See David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3, 8–11 
(2007).  
 38. See generally SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS 
AND STADIUMS (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). 
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employment, and tax revenue.
39
 Promoters assert that the franchise will 
enhance ―the cultural fabric‖ of a city in ways that defy empirical 
assessment.
40
 The evidence, however, suggests that publicly subsidized 
stadiums are not cost-effective job creation tools, nor are they 
particularly beneficial in urban redevelopment.
41
 Further, even 
assuming one credits those claims, if a new stadium attracts one of an 
arbitrarily limited number of teams, one city‘s gain is another city‘s 
loss.  
Examining new construction that occurred in ten cities between 
1958 and 1993, Robert Baade and Allen Sanderson estimated that a new 
stadium had either no effect or a negative effect on the city‘s share of 
amusement and recreation income.
42
 New stadiums draw scant business 
from outside local communities.
43
 Household entertainment demand is 
inelastic, so a new stadium mainly displaces local competitors such as 
movie theaters and amusement parks. Like an individual, a government 
has a budget constraint. Consequently, government money spent on 
stadiums diverts economic development from other forms of 
infrastructure toward labor-intensive, low wage, part-time jobs, such as 
staffing the parking lot or concession stands on game days.
44
 Money 
spent on stadiums with dubious spillovers is diverted from education, 
public health, public safety, and infrastructure with undeniable positive 
spillovers.
45
 Thus, stadium-building simply transfers wealth from a 
plethora of politically less favored industries whose aggregate loss 
exceeds the gain realized by the single favored one.  
                                                                                                                     
 39. See Benjamin A. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, in GOVERNMENT AND THE 
SPORTS BUSINESS 325, 327–29 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).  
 40. Dean V. Baim, The Rational Behavior Behind NFL Relocations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 
443, 450–51 (1999). 
 41. See generally Noll & Zimbalist eds., supra note 38. 
 42. See Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of Teams and 
Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, supra note 38, at 92; ROBERT A. BAADE, 
HEARTLAND INST. POL‘Y STUDY NO. 13, IS THERE AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR SUBSIDIZING 
SPORTS STADIUMS? 18–19 (1987) (concluding that stadiums do not create jobs; instead, jobs are 
―diverted from the manufacturing economy to the service economy, or from higher-skilled to 
lower-skilled (and lower-paid) occupations‖) 
 43. See Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 13, at 105–06 (discussing substitution in public 
spending); see also Safir, supra note 34, at 953 (noting that in St. Louis, San Francisco, and 
Washington, D.C., stadiums probably had a negative effect on per-capita income). 
 44. See Safir, supra note 34, at 953; see also, Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing 
of Professional Sports Stadiums: Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 201 (2002) 
(―Opportunity costs associated with a community‘s decision to build a stadium arise as scarce 
tax dollars, earmarked for stadium financing, are precluded from funding other public 
programs.‖). 
 45. See Brad R. Humphreys, The Economic Impact of Sporting Facilities, in HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 214, 217–18 (Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymanski eds., 2006). 
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Apart from opportunity cost, public underwriting of sporting 
facilities is demonstrably a very expensive tool of job creation. The new 
stadium used to draw the original Browns from Cleveland to become 
the Baltimore Ravens cost Maryland taxpayers $200 million in 1998.
46
 
Supporters claimed that 1,394 full-time jobs would materialize.
47
 That 
comes to a cost of $127,000 per job,
48
 but it takes a good while for most 
employees to aggregate that sum in their paychecks. Moreover, even 
when the initial figures can be formulated in a way that make them look 
positive, new stadiums are without exception plagued by construction 
problems and cost overruns.
49
 
Public subsidies do not just enrich wealthy sporting franchises, they 
also inure to the benefit of wealthy athletes. Teams often argue that they 
cannot attract the talent they need to compete in the league without 
taxpayer support, given the astronomical salaries today‘s players 
demand. The argument may sometimes have merit vis-à-vis an 
individual small-market team, but that is because it describes a 
prisoner‘s dilemma. If all other teams are able to pay astronomical 
salaries because they receive taxpayer support, one team will have 
tremendous difficulty securing comparable talent unless it follows suit. 
If none of the teams received taxpayer support, however, the salaries 
would not be so astronomical. 
The vast bulk of the paycheck of virtually every top tier professional 
athlete represents economic rent—a payment for services over and 
above the incentive required for its production.
50
 The average annual 
salary of a player in the NBA exceeds $5 million; in the MLB last 
season it was more than $3 million; in the NHL it is $2.4 million; in the 
NFL, $1.9 million.
51
 Those amounts do not include income from 
endorsements, public appearances, and the like, which for star athletes 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Keating, supra note 13, at 15 tbl.1. 
 47. Goodman, supra note 44, at 205–06. 
 48. Id. at 206. 
 49. Prospective assessments of the economic contribution of new stadiums by consultants 
employed by the teams and leagues are invariably positive: ―Every proposed facility will pump 
millions of new dollars of spending into the local economy during the construction period, and 
when built will continue to create thousands of new jobs, raise incomes significantly, and enrich 
local government coffers with millions of dollars in new tax revenues.‖ Humphreys, supra note 
45, at 215 (disparaging, not endorsing such claims). These prospective studies rely on unrealistic 
multipliers and overly optimistic cost predictions that are literally never borne out in retrospect. 
See id.  
 50. See Economic Rent Definition, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, available at 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/economic+rent?region=us (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
 51. Joe Dorish, Average Salaries in the NBA, NFL, MLB and NHL, YAHOO SPORTS (Nov. 
12, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=ycn-10423863. It is true that athletes in 
English soccer are also very well paid, but for reasons that are independent of promotion and 
relegation. 
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usually exceeds the salary component itself. At least as late as the 
1970s, less skilled major league baseball players held off-season jobs 
such as gas station attendants.
52
 As a young prospect, Hall of Famer 
Nolan Ryan spent a winter installing air conditioning.
53
 Adjusted for 
inflation, the minimum major league baseball salary at the time was 
$72,000 and the average was $175,000, which is to say substantially 
less than a fair number of upper end professorial salaries.
54
 Yet Ryan 
was unlikely to become a college professor and he and others toiled on 
in their dual baseball player–gas station attendant profession. 
Imagine what would happen if every player‘s salary was cut in half. 
How many of those athletes would quit playing and seek alternative 
employment? Some marginal players who earn well below the average 
would decide they had superior alternatives, as would some older 
players who had stashed away substantial investments. Some immature 
players of questionable talent would decide not to make an investment 
trying to become a star. The number exiting would be modest however, 
and more to the point they would be supporting players, the ones most 
easily replaced. Fans hardly recognize the names of ―near greats‖ who 
grease the skids for the stars; the stars‘ exploits are the ones most fans 
follow. The point is not that top tier athletes may be overpaid in some 
absolute sense. Rather, the point is that public funding of stadium 
construction and renovation inflates athletes‘ salaries without any 
corresponding benefit to the public. 
Public financing is so entrenched in America that the reader must 
imagine that no other way exists to finance modern high-caliber 
stadiums. England reveals a different model. Arsenal‘s recent move 
from their home of ninety-three years to a new facility stands in marked 
contrast to the American experience. The new Emirates Stadium has a 
capacity of 60,361,
55
 offering many more fans the chance to see their 
team in action than did the 38,500 seats in Highbury Stadium.
56 
The 
Emirates has much in common with New Yankee Stadium: the latter 
broke ground less than a month after the former officially opened,
57 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See Jim Caple, Take Me Out to the Gas Station, ESPN.COM (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=caple/110126_MLB_second_jobs&sportCat=
mlb. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Emirates Stadium, THESTADIUMGUIDE,  http://www.stadiumguide.com/emirates (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
 56. Highbury (Arsenal Stadium), THESTADIUMGUIDE, http://www.stadiumguide.com/high 
bury (last vistied Sept. 15, 2012). 
 57. Emirates Stadium opened on July 23, 2006, Emirates Stadium, supra note 55, while 
New Yankee Stadium broke ground on August 16, 2006, New Yankee Stadium, 
BALLPARKS.COM, http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/american/nyybpk.htm (last vistied Sept. 
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Arsenal and the Yankees are both wealthy, privately owned franchises 
based in world-class cities,
58
 and the two stadiums were designed by the 
same leading architectural firm.
59
 In stark contrast to its American 
counterpart, however, the Emirates was completed ahead of schedule 
and on budget, was built without public financing, and included other 
facilities for public use.
60
  
Exceptionally knowledgeable readers may think we have overstated 
our argument because English taxpayers have demonstrably funded 
some construction and renovation of professional stadiums. 
Government ownership is modest by U.S. standards, however—the 
local council has title or leasehold on twenty-one of the 116 stadiums 
used in the top five tiers of the English soccer pyramid, and council 
ownership becomes more common moving down the tiers. No higher 
tier has as many of its teams playing in council-owned stadiums as the 
fifth tier Conference‘s one-quarter. This season, only two Premier 
League teams—Manchester City and Swansea—use government 
stadiums, and Swansea‘s was funded by a 355,000 square foot retail 
park built as part of the project.
61
 Second tier West Ham is notable as 
well for the fine government-built stadium it will occupy in 2014, an 
acquisition that required defeating Tottenham Hotspur in Whitehall 
rather than on the playing field.
62
  
                                                                                                                     
15, 2012). 
 58. Andrew Allen, Forbes Rate Arsenal as 7th Most Valuable Sports Franchise in World, 
ARSEBLOG (Jul. 14, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://news.arseblog.com/2011/07/forbes-rate-arsenal-as-
7th-most-valuable-sports-franchise-in-world.  
 59. Both were designed by Populous, formerly known as HOK Sport Venue Event. See A 
Modern Classic: Yankee Stadium, POPULOUS, http://portfolio.populous.com/showcase/yankeesta 
dium.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); Europe‘s Most Successful Football Stadium: Emirates 
Stadium, POPULOUS, http://portfolio.populous.com/projects/emirates.html (last visited Aug. 30, 
2012). 
 60. See Emirates Stadium Completed Early, SIR-ROBERT-MCALPINE.COM (Jul. 24, 2006), 
http://www.sir-robert-mcalpine.com/news/?page=4&id=1606. Arsenal used the odd corners of 
its new property to construct housing for sale. Rather than remaining empty except on game 
days, as most areas surrounding American stadiums do, Brighton and Hove Albion‘s new 
stadium includes bars, clubs, convention facilities, a daycare center, and instructional space for 
the University of Brighton. See Hire Emirates Stadium, ARSENAL.COM (Aug. 4, 2007), 
http://www.arsenal.com/membership/special-offers/hire-emirates-stadium. In instances when 
the United Kingdom provides public financing, typically for smaller and less profitable teams, a 
widened public access is a common condition. The national government dispenses most public 
stadium construction funds, such as they are, bypassing intercity competition for team 
representation. 
 61. RobertT, Swansea‘s Development, forum post at http://thetownend.com/index 
.php?topic=8036.0;wap2 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
 62. For commercial and legal reasons, it is currently unclear whether West Ham will 
actually move to the Olympic Stadium. See David Gold, West Ham United Refusing to Commit 
Themselves to Olympic Stadium Move, INSIDE THE GAMES (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.insidethe 
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Subtly, however, the stadiums of Manchester City and West Ham as 
well as the temporary home of fourth tier Rotherham United support 
this Article‘s argument. All three structures resulted from competition 
among nations for international athletic events—the 2002 
Commonwealth Games (Manchester City), the 2012 Olympics (West 
Ham), and the 1991 World Student Games (Rotherham United). 
Organizers of these events make the same sort of demands on aspiring 
nations as American leagues make on cities and states—if Great Britain 
wanted to be host, lavish facilities were required. Even the most ardent 
critic of government stadium funding would agree that after an event 
like the Olympics has concluded, the facilities should be used for some 
compatible purpose. 
In addition to those three examples, over the past fifteen years the 
British government has allocated significant funds to renovate stadiums 
not just in England but throughout Great Britain.
63
 To see the 
compatibility with our argument, the reader must understand the 
Hillsborough tragedy. At one time, only a minority of fans at soccer 
matches had a seat; the majority stood in areas known as terraces that 
inclined toward the pitch to afford a better view over fans farther down. 
Terraces still provide the majority of capacity in lower tier stadiums.  
During the early minutes of a 1989 cup semifinal at Sheffield 
Wednesday‘s Hillsborough Stadium, overcrowding at the top of a 
terrace by late-arriving fans crushed fans at the bottom against a fence 
that was intended to prevent field invasions, but inadvertently barred 
escape. Ninety-six died. That event followed a similar one in 1981 that 
injured thirty-eight fans. Such human landslides would be unlikely if 
fans had seats.
64
 
The British government responded by banning terraces in the 
pyramid‘s upper tiers, a time-consuming conversion that is still ongoing 
as additional teams are promoted.
65
 A standing fan occupies less space 
than a seated one, however, so banning terraces has diminished the 
number of tickets for sale. All-seater stadiums also deprive fans of a 
sense of camaraderie that many had enjoyed.
66
 These renovations were 
                                                                                                                     
games.biz/olympics/summer-olympics/2012/15521-west-ham-united-refusing-to-commit-themsel 
ves-to-olympic-stadium-move. 
 63. Kevin Hollett, Raising the Roof, Raising Questions: BC Place Stadium renovations 
and the cost to taxpayers, MEGAPHONE (Sept. 30, 10:27 AM) http://megaphonemagazine.com/ 
magazine/310/raising-the-roof-raising-questions-bc-place-stadium-renovations-and-the-cost-to-
taxpayers (last visited Dec. 1, 2011). 
 64. LORD JUSTICE TAYLOR, THE HILLSBOROUGH STADIUM DISASTER: INQUIRY BY THE RT 
HON LORD JUSTICE TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT 12, paras. 61–64 (1989).  
 65. See ANTHONY KING, THE END OF THE TERRACES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENGLISH 
FOOTBALL IN THE 1990S 100–03 (Leicester University Press 2002) (1998). 
 66. See e.g., MICHAEL CRICK, THE BOSS: THE MANY SIDES OF ALEX FERGUSON 360 
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compelled by the state and only reluctantly accepted by most clubs.  
Distinguishing most British government stadium investments from 
the result of coercive rent-seeking by American teams is uncomplicated: 
first, improving fan safety rather than improving club profitability is the 
British motive; second, many government investments result in 
renovations that British clubs oppose due to lost seating and diminished 
fan enthusiasm. Moreover, well-heeled clubs bear the expense 
themselves, though clubs in financial distress often receive aid when 
undertaking mandated renovations. National funding characterizes most 
British government support, and that level of government lacks the 
incentive of cities to encourage teams to move. 
In sum, while the billions of dollars spent by American taxpayers on 
sporting stadiums are not entirely wasted, they are predominantly a 
transfer of wealth from the public at large, not just sports fans, to private 
commercial interests. The empirical literature overwhelmingly 
concludes that the long-term public cost of stadium construction 
outweighs the public benefits. Politicians and stadium boosters are able 
to gloss over economic reality because the complexity of stadium 
financing obscures the true cost to the public. Even though stadium 
construction may have public benefits, the English experience shows 
that private incentives get new stadiums built when the benefit exceeds 
the cost. The next Part examines the underlying causes of the stadium 
rent-seeking phenomenon and highlight the consequences of divergence 
between the closed system of American leagues with the freedom of 
entry created by a promotion and relegation system.  
II.  CAUSES 
The extraordinary leverage that teams hold over American cities is a 
product of strong demand, limited supply, closed entry, and the ability 
to make credible threats to move. As this Part explains, the strong 
demand driven by intense public interest in sports and the fallibility of 
local political systems are necessary preconditions. However, as those 
are common factors in England and America, they cannot provide an 
explanation of the prevalence of a form of rent-seeking in America that 
remains muted across the pond. Some commentators focus on 
―franchise free-agency‖ or team freedom of movement as the root cause 
of stadium rent-seeking, but that analysis confuses cause and effect. 
English soccer teams are also free to move but, as their host city stands 
to lose relatively little, little can be gained by threatening. The 
foundation of the problem is the cartelization of American leagues.  
                                                                                                                     
(Pocket Books) (2003). 
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A.  Demand 
The root cause of unproductive stadium rent-seeking is usually 
ascribed to an irrational public demand or a dysfunctional political 
system, or some combination of the two.
67
 Both are accurate, but 
incomplete.  
The former suggests excessive attachment to sports, leading 
taxpayers to tolerate large transfers to maintain or gain local league 
representation. Though the demand for local representation in top tier 
leagues appears to be quite inelastic, that is also true in the United 
Kingdom and cannot account for the difference. The latter argument 
takes two forms: either shortsighted municipal leadership—that is, 
incompetence—or else standard public choice theory—groups that have 
a focused interest exploiting a skewed political system against a public 
that has diffused interests. Like the irrational demand argument, the 
political explanation certainly captures some aspects of stadium rent-
seeking, but it also fails to explain English and American differences. 
For a local politician, facilitating publicly financed stadium 
renovation or construction offers immediate and extraordinary benefits. 
Strong civic interest in retaining or obtaining a team means that press 
reports on a politician‘s effort (or lack of effort) will be extensive and 
exhaustive. Political elites‘ ability to dispense construction contracts 
selectively provides them with an additional and less well-reported 
benefit.
68
 Much of the cost of renovation or new construction, in 
contrast, falls well into the future on people who are in a poor position 
to predict their individual burdens. 
In effect, a team‘s ability to offer a move to a new city, and a 
simultaneous threat to leave their host, benefits not just the team but 
also city officials. By receiving an offer or threat, politicians gain a 
derived offer or threat to forward to their electorate.
69
 The threats 
regarding public stadium finance are aimed at a broad general public, 
and doubtless would incite retribution at the polls if issuing directly 
from city officials. Without risking adverse political outcomes, 
politically skillful city officials turn threats from unelected team 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See SARAH WILHELM, CTR. FOR PUB. POL‘Y & ADMIN., THE UNIV. OF UTAH, PUBLIC 
FUNDING OF SPORTS STADIUMS 2, 8–9 (2008), available at http://cppa.utah.edu/_documents/publ 
ications/finance-tax/sports-stadiums.pdf.  
 68. See David R. Herwitz, Accounting for Long-Term Construction Contracts: A 
Lawyer‘s Approach, 70 HARV. L. REV. 449, 455–56 & nn.20–21 (1957) (explaining how the 
clever timing of contracts can be used to shift or eliminate tax burdens). 
 69. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory 
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 117 (1987) (discussing the benefits accruing to 
politicians from their ability to threaten to withhold or withdraw benefits from small and 
coalesced interest groups).  
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management to their benefit by adopting the role of savior. 
Though public choice theory is useful for understanding the 
problem, it is incomplete for two reasons. First, it explains too little: 
many rent-seekers have the ear of politicians, combining the clout of 
wealth with the political advantage of broadly dispersed costs and 
concentrated benefits,
70
 yet local governments are particularly 
responsive to the demands of professional sports teams. Consider 
Cincinnati‘s Hamilton County, Ohio, which assumed more than $1 
billion in debt to pay for one stadium for baseball and another for 
football, and in consequence was forced to roll back a property-tax 
break when (surprise!) the two projects soared way over their initial 
budgets.
71
 
Second, the public choice story explains too much: the political 
advantage described applies also to British politicians, who are also 
elected under a single-member district plurality electoral system, yet 
there the practice is rare.
72
 An explanation for the divergence is 
required. Pointing simply to ―cultural differences‖ seems unsatisfactory 
given apparent cultural similarities across much of the English-speaking 
world. At any rate, as our comparison below between professional and 
collegiate football stadiums within the United States shows, the 
―cultural differences‖ thesis is unsupported by the evidence.73 
The previously mentioned opacity of infrastructure financing also 
contributes to the public choice dynamic.
74
 Residents of Chicago know 
that the Bears and White Sox play in subsidized stadiums,
75
 but few of 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL 
MARKETS 98–102 (1981) (providing a taxonomy of demand and supply for legislation based on 
the extent to which both costs and benefits are distributed or concentrated); JAMES Q. WILSON, 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 333–34 (1973) (examining the extent of interest group activity based 
on the distribution of costs and benefits). 
 71. Reed Albertgotti & Cameron McWhirter, A Stadium‘s Costly Legacy Throws 
Taxpayers for a Loss, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 
001424052748704461304576216330349497852.html. 
 72. See generally Calvin Jones, A Level Playing Field? Sports Stadium Infrastructure and 
Urban Development in the United Kingdom, 33 ENV‘T & PLAN. 845 (2001).  
 73. See infra Section II.D. 
 74. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 75. The Illinois legislature approved a $432 million contribution to rebuild Soldier Field 
for the Chicago Bears. ―Chicago-area taxpayers will be paying off the debt for more than thirty 
years, at a total cost of $1.3 billion.‖ Scott, supra note 30, at 46; Marc Edelman, How to Curb 
Professional Sports‘ Bargaining Power vis-à-vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
280, 281 (2003). In the face of the team‘s threat to relocate to the Tampa SMSA, Illinois voters 
authorized a $60 million stadium subsidy to the Chicago White Sox. Under the final bonding 
provision, however, the team actually received $150 million. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional 
Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. 
L.J. 25, 25 & n.3 (1991). 
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us realize that we also support facilities across the nation for both major 
and minor league teams. Our stadiums certainly are a bargain for the 
teams and players, while taxpayers outside Chicago cannot spare the 
time to pay much attention to Chicago, so few of them even recognize 
the load they are bearing. Even the knowledgeable few can ill afford to 
do anything about it. In other words, much of the weight falls on 
taxpayers who are rationally ignorant and rationally apathetic because 
individually their contributions are small (though sizable when 
aggregated across them). 
Even fully informed Chicago sports fans might be happy to have the 
new stadiums, considering that foregoing the local construction would 
have led to no reciprocity elsewhere in the nation, but we bear the 
burden in reflection. We pay only part of the cost of local stadium 
construction but simultaneously bear part of the burden for a plethora of 
publically financed stadiums across the nation, the vast majority of 
which we will never enter. What could seem a bargain under a local 
focus morphs into a bald-faced swindle under a national focus—another 
prisoner‘s dilemma, now facing the voters. 
The U.S. federated structure may exacerbate rent-seeking behavior, 
but it does not cause it; without the cartelizing effects created by closed 
entry and franchise free agency discussed below, the stadium rent-
seeking we observe in the United States is unlikely to occur in the 
United Kingdom As such, the fact that U.S. political structure 
encourages rent-seeking behavior is a reason to be more attentive to the 
possibility of promotion and relegation as a solution. 
B.  Supply 
1.  The Closed American Sports System 
Because a team cannot join the National Football League, Major 
League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National 
Hockey League, nor even (the perversely named) Major League Soccer 
without permission of the existing members, incumbent American 
franchises determine their own competition, while English teams do not. 
Teams have an obvious interest in restricting entry if they can. If the 
initial teams in a league were placed in the best locales, being selected 
sequentially from the most attractive option on down, once a minimum 
threshold is reached, increasing league size should increase total 
revenue but reduce average revenue.
76
 That makes incumbents hostile 
toward new contestants unless and until an aspirant demonstrates an 
ability to enter the industry without permission. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See Noll, supra note 11, at 176–77. 
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New teams refused entry into the existing league could form their 
own league, but that poses a much less serious challenge in sports than 
in other industries. An investor can risk his capital founding a new 
bakery without any agreement with other bakeries, existing or potential, 
but an investor cannot form a successful insurgent sports team unless a 
number of other investors take the same risk at the same time. Consider 
the difficulty Volkswagen would have had entering the U.S. market in 
competition with the domestic incumbents had it been necessary to 
persuade Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Fiat, and Volvo to take the leap the 
exact same year. Volkswagen did not have to play against another 
entrant to be successful, but a new team unwelcomed by the incumbents 
will fail if the owner cannot persuade other investors to form its playing 
competition. A single enterprise acting alone cannot produce the sports 
product; there have to be other teams to compete against. 
Many rival leagues tried to enter American professional major 
league sports during the twentieth century, but only the American 
Baseball League and American Football League (AFL) saw their entire 
collection of teams survive. To be sure, the incumbents occasionally 
take in a few strong teams from insurgent leagues (for example, the 
original Cleveland Browns, Indiana Pacers, and Edmonton Oilers), but a 
good part of the attraction of admitting those teams into the existing 
league was to precipitate or hasten the insurgent league‘s demise.77 
The survival of the American Football League was especially 
noteworthy considering the measures the NFL took to impede it. During 
the 1950s, the NFL had two teams in Chicago, though the Bears 
overshadowed the Cardinals. Dallas businessman Lamar Hunt 
attempted unsuccessfully to buy the Cardinals and move the team to his 
hometown.
78
 The NFL then rebuffed Hunt when he asked for a Dallas 
expansion franchise.
79
 As a third attempt, during 1959, Hunt joined with 
other investors to form the AFL, with the Dallas Texans to be his 
franchise.
80
 The new league announced a 1960 inaugural season. 
Before the AFL could even get off the ground, the NFL authorized 
the Cardinals to move to St. Louis for the 1959 season. St. Louis had 
lacked a professional football team and thus had been an attractive 
target for the new league. The AFL forged ahead nonetheless, but, 
before it could commence its inaugural season, the NFL lured its 
                                                                                                                     
 77. The NHL expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s was driven, at least in part, by 
the desire to prevent rival leagues forming or transitioning from minor league status. See Seattle 
Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. NHL, 783 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 78. ED GRUVER, THE AMERICAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE: A YEAR-BY-YEAR HISTORY, 1960–
1969 13 (1997). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. at 14. 
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Minnesota franchise away as an NFL expansion team. The defection of 
Minnesota forced the upstart league to put together another group of 
investors in short order or begin play with only seven teams, which 
would have left one team idle each week throughout the season.
81
 The 
NFL also had a sudden change of heart regarding expansion. Rather 
than awarding an expansion team to Hunt, however, the league inserted 
a competitor into Dallas.
82
 The Texans and the Cowboys both began 
play in 1960, but after three seasons the Texans moved to Kansas City 
and became the Chiefs. The AFL filed an antitrust suit against their 
rival, but it was unsuccessful.
83
 
2.  Freedom of Entry through Promotion and Relegation 
Although deeply rooted in America, the closed nature of sporting 
leagues is not normal by international standards. As in most of the 
world, in England, teams do not play year-in and year-out against the 
                                                                                                                     
 81. The Kansas Vikings, MINNESOTA VIKINGS TEAM HISTORY, http://www.kansas 
viking.com/history.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2012). The Oakland Raiders, who actually played 
in San Francisco their first two seasons, were that hastily organized franchise. The Raiders won 
only nine of their first forty-two games, the poorest performance by any of the AFL‘s founding 
teams. Assuming one is not asking for a reference to the necessity of one idle team in an odd-
number league, check http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_ Football_League and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oakland_raiders. 
 82. Joe McGruff, KC Sports Institution Started After NFL Snubbed Hunt, KAN. CITY 
STAR, Aug. 8, 1982. The NFL also announced plans for an expansion franchise in Houston but 
never followed through with the threat. Id. 
 83. Am. Football League v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 80 (D. Md. 1962), aff‘d, 323 F.2d 124 
(4th Cir. 1963). The NFL reaction to the AFL resembled its earlier and successful effort to 
thwart the All American Football Conference, from which it extracted the original Cleveland 
Browns, the San Francisco 49ers, and a Baltimore team that promptly failed. For similar 
instances regarding baseball, consider the Pacific Coast League‘s (PCL) mid-1950s major 
league aspirations and the aborted formation of the Continental League. Six of the eight PCL 
teams played in SMSAs that today host an identical number of major league teams. The PCL 
teams were not promoted, however, but were displaced either by existing teams that moved to 
the coast (Dodgers, Giants, and Athletics) or by expansion teams that bought their way into 
MLB (Angels, Padres, and Seattle Pilots). Two separate teams bought their way into the Seattle 
market—after local government ignored their stadium complaints, the Pilots moved to become 
the Milwaukee Brewers two years after the Braves had moved to Atlanta; eight years later, 
another expansion team, the Mariners, formed to occupy the Kingdome after a repentant local 
government built it. The two remaining PCL teams played in Sacramento and Portland, large 
cities that today host major league basketball teams, and no doubt would host baseball teams 
with serious major league ambitions if promotion and relegation were an American practice. All 
of the displaced PCL teams moved to smaller markets, displacing lower tier minor league teams 
in the process. Because New York City had lost two of its three teams to California, William 
Shea, thinking to fill that void, convened other entrepreneurs with an intention to form the 
Continental League. Unfortunately for Shea and his colleagues, at that time baseball‘s reserve 
clause gave indefinite title to a player‘s baseball playing services to whichever team owned his 
contract. The new league could not acquire enough top tier players even to begin play. 
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same opponents, but instead rely on promotion and relegation to ensure 
parity within a season. The English football structure is distinguishable 
from the American in all the ways discussed above, but importantly it is 
also distinguishable from the structure across the world because it 
promotes and relegates teams across an incredible twenty-three tiers. No 
other country has such a deep system of promotion and relegation. 
Scotland, for instance, practices promotion and relegation across only 
four tiers, admitting additional teams only when an incumbent becomes 
insolvent (for example, Gretna in 2008), while Italy and Spain each 
maintain the practice across ten tiers. 
Thus the English and American leagues are best viewed as opposite 
ends of a continuum of openness rather than a binary choice between 
open and closed competition. The lower tiers of the English pyramid are 
mainly recreational, company, social club, pub, and church teams, but 
promotion and relegation links them automatically step by step to the 
elite tiers. Each team in the lower tiers is endowed with the potential to 
improve and progress, perhaps even to the Premier League (for 
example, Wigan Athletic FC
84
) without requesting permission from the 
teams at the top. 
That English leagues do not control entry into the pyramid is 
crucial; that function lies in the hands of an older and more 
comprehensive organization known as the Football Association (FA). 
The FA governs all the teams in the pyramid, amateur and part-time 
semiprofessional teams as well as the full-time professional clubs, and 
is older, distinct from, and independent of any league. Upon formal 
application, the Football Association will assign any individual or group 
that can finance the formation of a team of any skill level to the tier the 
FA judges appropriate. Following its assignment by the FA, a team 
finds its suitable level through promotion and relegation. That aspect of 
the system is crucial to its success because no permanent harm occurs if 
the FA‘s initial assignment is wrong—a team placed too high will fall, a 
team placed too low will rise. Consequently, the payoff for influencing 
the FA‘s allocation decision is small, and in the long run irrelevant.85 
Would the adoption of promotion and relegation work in North 
America? One objection to this proposal is that it would decrease 
variety in the American leagues. This objection rests on two 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Wigan bounced around in the lower tiers for many decades before entering the 
English League in the fourth tier in 1978. They ultimately rose to the Premier League in 2005, 
where they have remained since (despite some very close calls). See Latics League Finishing 
Positions, WIGAN ATHLETICS (Feb. 15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.wiganlatics.co.uk/club/ 
history/history-finishingpositions.aspx. 
 85. The absence of serious attempts to influence initial FA assignments is analogous to 
the dog that did not bark. 
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misconceptions. First, promotion and relegation is not incompatible 
with the features of American sports that improve variety, such as salary 
caps, the draft of players from lower to higher tiers, and a limited 
roster.
86
 Putting aside player transition from collegiate to professional 
that is important in the NFL and NBA, it is not immediately apparent 
how a lower tier to higher tier draft of professional baseball and ice 
hockey players could be made compatible with a potential-entry-
preserving promotion and relegation system—which hardly means an 
imaginative innovator could not design one. American leagues could 
retain the other two rules seamlessly, however, even after implementing 
promotion and relegation. 
Most importantly, American league salary caps are compatible with 
promotion and relegation. Thus salary caps, particularly the extent to 
which they prevent a semi-permanent dominance by a few top teams, 
are tangential. Despite salary caps, notable dominance of a few teams is 
also observed in many American competitions. To educate an ignorant 
American for example, a European sports fan may liken a team such as 
Manchester United, Bayern Munich, or Juventus to ―the New York 
Yankees of [its league].‖ 
In much of the world, only a team‘s bank account limits its wage 
bill and roster. Though rules define the number of players on the field 
during any one game, the group of players under contract from which to 
select that limited number has historically been undefined. In 
consequence, a few wealthy teams have such large rosters that an elite 
world-class player such as David Beckham might spend a season as a 
substitute (as he did, albeit on Real Madrid‘s bench in Spain).87 Not 
only are those rules independent of the promotion and relegation 
system, they lie beyond the topic here. 
The second misconception is that year-to-year volatility within 
American major leagues swamps that of the Premier League. Unlimited 
player rosters, the absence of a salary cap, and the additional financial 
rewards of playing in Europe confer significant advantages on the top 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Nor are these features uniformly implemented in American sports. Major League 
Baseball, for example, has a luxury tax instead of a salary cap. See Baseball Luxury Tax, STEVE 
THE UMP, http://www.stevetheump.com/luxury_tax.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). The NHL 
now has a salary floor as well as a cap. See Greg Wyshynski, The war over the NHL‘s salary 
cap floor, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 6, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nhl/blog/ 
puck_daddy/post/the-war-over-the-nhls-salary-cap-floor?urn=nhl,wp11924. 
 87. English Premier League teams are now subject to a roster restriction of sorts: at the 
end of each semi-annual transfer window, each club is limited to twenty-five players over the 
age of twenty-one, at least eight of whom must be ―home-grown‖ as defined by the rules. Jeff 
Rusnak, New Roster Rules to Test Premier League Market, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Aug. 14, 2010), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-08-14/sports/fl-soccer-rusnak-0815-20100814_1_manche 
ster-city-richard-scudamore-brazil-striker-robinho. 
25
Haddock et al.:  League Structure &Stadium Rent Seeking— the Role of Antitrust Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
26 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
English teams.
88
 However, these advantages are not intrinsic to 
promotion and relegation. Moreover, a more careful analysis shows that 
the entry opportunity allowed by promotion and relegation in English 
football is more than theoretical: there is significant movement of teams 
among the tiers, including teams moving in just a few years from the 
Premier League all the way down to competition with semiprofessional 
teams, with other teams replacing them from below. 
Some observers claim that year-to-year volatility within American 
major leagues swamps that in England, reflected not only in a small 
number of semipermanent elite Premier League teams but in illusory 
movement between tiers as well.
89
 The teams in the upper part of the 
top tier seem to be the same this season as last. Promoted teams often 
were relegated just a year or two earlier—they are called ―poppers‖: 
they pop up a tier one season, pop down a tier the next, pop up a tier 
soon after, and so on. Indeed, there do seem to be a few teams that 
rarely play out of the top tier, and a few poppers as well.
90
 Even if the 
assertion adequately characterized, say, three-quarters of the teams, it 
would not alter our argument—economics works at the margin. There is 
potential competition if there is room for even a few invaders of the top 
table. 
As a matter of fact and as we show below, the prior paragraph‘s 
claim is untrue, at least for England. For example, Leeds United won 
the Premier League in 1991–1992, having regained Premier League 
status only two years earlier.
91
 Leeds were then relegated in 2004, and 
subsequently relegated again from the second to the third tier in 2007.
92
 
At the other end of the scale, the richest team in the League, Manchester 
United, who many Americans imagine to be perennial favorites, were 
relegated in 1974, and were in danger of relegation again in 1986 until 
                                                                                                                     
 88. UEFA recently adopted a European wide policy of ―financial fair play‖ that operates, 
broadly speaking, like a salary cap. The policy will take effect in 2013.  See UEFA, UEFA CLUB 
LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS (2010), available at http://www.uefa.com/ 
MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/50/09/12/1500912_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
 89. See SIMON KUPER & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, SOCCERNOMICS: WHY ENGLAND LOSES, 
WHY GERMANY AND BRAZIL WIN, AND WHY THE US, JAPAN, TURKEY—AND EVEN IRAQ—ARE 
DESTINED TO BECOME THE KINGS OF THE WORLD‘S MOST POPULAR SPORT 167–69 (2009) 
(arguing that the volatility is actually more similar than perceived). 
90.  All three teams promoted to the top tier for the 2011-12 season – Swansea, Norwich, 
and Queens Park – avoided relegation after finishing 11th, 12th, and 17th in the twenty-team 
Premier League.  Of the three teams relegated that season, only West Ham popped immediately 
back up, and that by winning a four-team playoff for the final of the three promotion spots. 
 91. Matthew Balmforth, ‗Whatever Happened‘ to the Leeds United Title Winners of 
1992?, FOOTBALLFANCAST, (Sept. 12, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://www.footballfancast.com/2010/ 
09/football-blogs/whatever-happened-to-the-leeds-united-title-winners-of-1992. 
 92. Jim Howlett, Leeds United—From Milan to Yeovil, SOCCERLENS (Nov. 10, 2008), 
http://soccerlens.com/leeds-united-from-milan-to-yeovil/15752. 
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Sir Alex Ferguson was appointed manager.
93
 
The impression of Premier League year-to-year inertia proceeds 
from a faulty frame of reference. A good deal of season-to-season 
stability is inevitable given the mechanism employed, which relegates 
only three teams each year. This year‘s Premier League must look very 
much like last year‘s regardless of long-run entry potential. Even if no 
relegated team subsequently regained Premier League status, it would 
take at least seven years for the league to turn over completely. 
Inevitably, season-to-season comparisons are misleading. 
Table 1 shows the most recent year in which each team from the 
recently completed Premier League season last played in the second 
tier. Seven teams have remained continuously in the top tier during the 
present century, Arsenal since World War I. However, nearly twice that 
number—thirteen—spent time in lower tiers during the past decade. 
Consider Blackburn, promoted from the second tier in 1992, second in 
the Premier League  in 1994 and then champion in 1995,
94
 relegated in 
1999, promoted again in 2001, (and now relegated still again for the 
2012-13 season)—apparently a popper, but also a champion. Wigan had 
never played in the top tier at all before 2005, indeed, had never even 
played in the Football League until 1976, but has now retained its spot 
in the Premier League for an eighth consecutive season. Two other 
teams, Reading and Hull City, reached the top for the first time even 
more recently, in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Manchester United, 
Tottenham Hotspur, Chelsea, and Newcastle, all world-renowned teams 
that have won multiple top tier championships, played in the second tier 
as recently as 1975, 1978, 1989, and 2010 respectively.
95
 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Rob Smyth, A Brief History of Manchester United, ESPN.COM (Jul. 1, 2012), 
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/feature/_/id/841082?cc=5901. 
 94.  Blackburn were runners up the previous year. Matthew Adams, The History of 
Blackburn Rovers FC, HELIUM (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.helium.com/items/2238385-the-
history-of-blackburn-rovers-fc. 
 95. The same applies to the once formidable Sunderland who played in the second tier in 
2007. 
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Table 1—Most Recent Year Out of the Top Tier 
Arsenal (London) 1915 
Everton (Liverpool) 1954 
Liverpool 1962 
Manchester United  1975 
Tottenham (London) 1978 
Aston Villa (Birmingham) 1988 
Chelsea (London) 1989 
Fulham (London) 2001 
Blackburn 2001 
Bolton (Greater Manchester) 2001 
Manchester City 2002 
Wigan (Greater Manchester) 2005 
Sunderland (Tyne and Wear) 2007 
Stoke 2008 
Wolves (Wolverhampton) 2009 
Newcastle (Tyne and Wear) 2010 
West Bromwich (Birmingham) 2010 
Queens Park (London) 2011 
Norwich 2011 
Swansea 2011 
 
Table 2 compares the top tier‘s composition over a longer span, 
contrasting top tier teams of 2011–12—the most recent complete 
season—with top tier teams twenty years earlier.96  
                                                                                                                     
 96. At the opening of the 1991–1992 season, the top tier was the Football League First 
Division. All First Division teams withdrew in February to form the Premier League, an 
independent organization that continues promotion and relegation with the second tier now 
known as the Football League Championship. See infra Table 2A. 
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Table 2A—The Fate of Top-Tier Teams Across Two Decades 
 1991–92 First Division 2011–12 Premier League 
 Arsenal (London) Arsenal (London) 
 Aston Villa (Birmingham) Aston Villa (Birmingham) 
 Chelsea (London) Chelsea (London) 
 Everton (Liverpool) Everton (Liverpool) 
 Liverpool Liverpool 
 Manchester City Manchester City 
 Manchester United Manchester United 
 Norwich Norwich 
 Queens Park (London) Queens Park (London) 
 Tottenham (London) Tottenham (London) 
 Coventry 2nd Tier 
 Crystal Palace (London) 2nd Tier 
Champion Leeds 2nd Tier 
 Nottingham Forest 2nd Tier 
 Southampton 2nd Tier 
 West Ham (London) 2nd Tier 
 Notts County (Nottingham) 3rd Tier 
 Oldham (Greater Manchester) 3rd Tier 
 Sheffield United 3rd Tier 
 Sheffield Wednesday 3rd Tier 
 Wimbledon (London) 3rd Tier 
 Luton Town 5th Tier 
 2nd Tier Blackburn 
 2nd Tier Newcastle (Tyne and Wear) 
 2nd Tier Sunderland (Tyne and Wear) 
 2nd Tier Wolves (Wolverhampton) 
 3rd Tier Bolton (Greater Manchester) 
 3rd Tier Fulham (London) 
 3rd Tier Stoke City 
 3rd Tier Swansea 
 3rd Tier West Bromwich (Birmingham) 
 3rd Tier Wigan (Greater Manchester) 
When a new locale gains entry into the Premier League the 
enterprise is a new entrant.  A comparison with the NFL over a similar 
timespan is instructive. Other than the Jacksonville Jaguars, Carolina 
Panthers, Houston Texans, and the new Cleveland Browns—all of them 
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expansion teams admitted after hefty side payments to the incumbent 
cartel—the enterprises are precisely the same, though several have 
moved to new cities in order to reap rent seeking profits. 
Table 2B—The Fate of NFL Teams Across Two Decades 
1991 NFL Teams 2011 NFL Teams 
Chicago Bears  Chicago Bears  
Arizona Cardinals  Arizona Cardinals  
Green Bay Packers  Green Bay Packers  
New York Giants  New York Giants  
Detroit Lions  Detroit Lions 
Washington Redskins  Washington Redskins  
Pittsburgh Steelers  Pittsburgh Steelers  
Philadelphia Eagles  Philadelphia Eagles  
Los Angeles Rams*  St. Louis Rams 
Cleveland Browns  Baltimore Ravens 
San Francisco 49ers  San Francisco 49ers  
Indianapolis Colts Indianapolis Colts  
Dallas Cowboys  Dallas Cowboys  
Minnesota Vikings  Minnesota Vikings  
Atlanta Falcons  Atlanta Falcons  
New Orleans Saints  New Orleans Saints  
Buffalo Bills  Buffalo Bills  
Miami Dolphins  Miami Dolphins  
New England Patriots  New England Patriots  
New York Jets  New York Jets  
Cincinnati Bengals  Cincinnati Bengals  
Houston Oilers* Tennessee Titans  
Denver Broncos  Denver Broncos  
Kansas City Chiefs Kansas City Chiefs 
Los Angeles Raiders*  Oakland Raiders  
San Diego Chargers San Diego Chargers 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers  Tampa Bay Buccaneers  
Seattle Seahawks  Seattle Seahawks  
 Jacksonville Jaguars  
 Carolina Panthers  
 Cleveland Browns
#
 
 Houston Texans  
* The Houston Oilers became the Tennessee Titans in 1999; the Rams moved to St. 
Louis in 1995; and the Raiders returned to Oakland in 1995.  
#
 The pre-1996 Cleveland Browns became the Baltimore Ravens. Although the NFL 
records indicate otherwise, the current Cleveland Browns are a new NFL franchise 
established in 1999. 
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Leeds won the 1991–1992 championship, but has spent the past 
eight seasons out of the Premier League, three of them in the third tier. 
Five other top tier teams from 1991–1992 now compete with Leeds in 
the second tier, while an additional five compete in the third tier.
97
 Poor 
Luton has fallen all the way to the fifth tier. Thus twelve of the top tier 
teams of 1991–1992—more than half—are in lower tiers in 2011–2012, 
and most teams in this season‘s Premier League have spent intervening 
seasons relegated to lower tiers. Recently promoted Norwich and 
Queens Park each spent fifteen of the intervening twenty years in the 
second and third tiers. 
The analysis can be more comprehensive still. Including the 2011–
2012 season, the twenty-two First Division teams from 1991–1992 will 
have played 220 seasons in aggregate over the past decade.
98
 Table 3 
shows the distribution of the top 1991–1992 teams across all tiers.  
 
Table 3 
Tier 1 
97 
seasons 
44.1 % 
Tier 2 
71 
seasons 
32.3 % 
Tier 3 
40 
seasons 
18.2 % 
Tier 4 
9 
seasons 
4.1 % 
Tier 5 
3 
seasons 
1.4 % 
 
The English Premier League teams experienced no random draw 
(that would indeed have been surprising) but neither in aggregate did 
they spend even half the recent decade in the top tier. In general, the 
Table reveals considerable entry potential. 
A second objection to the adoption of promotion and relegation in 
North America is that no minor league teams exist that could constitute 
meaningful competitors for major league rivals. This is no reason why 
promotion and relegation could not work here—rather, it is an 
                                                                                                                     
 97. The statement takes Milton Keynes to be the continuation of the original Wimbledon. 
See infra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. If AFC Wimbledon, the team that replaced the 
original Wimbledon, is taken as the continuation, Wimbledon would count as a fourth tier team 
rather than a third. 
 98. For the reasons discussed above, the computation excludes the first decade following 
the 1991–1992 season to control against the inevitable strong serial correlation imparted by the 
three-team-per-year mechanism of promotion and relegation. 
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endogenous artifact of the system itself, a product of the impossibility 
of entry. If entry into the top tier were a meaningful prospect, there 
would be an incentive to develop stronger teams in the tiers below—if 
you build it they will come. In promotion and relegation systems, there 
always exists at least one other competitive tier of competition, and 
usually more.  
Although promotion and relegation is alien to the American context, 
it is easy to imagine how it could be introduced. Take the NFL, for 
example. At season‘s end the 32 teams could be divided into top and 
bottom halves according to won/lost records, creating two 16-team 
divisions— a number with which the NFL is very experienced from its 
final years of pre-merger competition with the AFL. Because the 
number of teams in American leagues is driven not by considerations of 
optimal league size for competitive purposes but rather to keep the 
number of large but unserved cities too few to permit a competing 
league to intrude, the closeness of competition at each level would 
actually improve the following season. A third division of 16 expansion 
teams could initiate play in a third division with automatic promotion 
the incentive for performance.  Surely a new Los Angeles based team 
would soon be taking turns in the top tier. In time, other tiers that met 
the ambitions of entrepreneurs in still smaller cities could be added, 
accompanied no doubt by additional teams in cities already represented 
in the league.   
Promotion and relegation can cause instability because the decline in 
revenue associated with relegation can be too steep to support expenses 
such as player contracts that were appropriate to the higher tier. The 
English Premier League addresses this concern by giving exiting teams 
a ―parachute payment‖ over three years while they make necessary 
adjustments.
99
 It is common for player and staff contracts to include an 
automatic salary reduction in the event of relegation.
100
 The transition to 
promotion and relegation might work differently in sports such as 
hockey and baseball which already have strong minor leagues.
101
 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Parachute Payments and Their Use by the FA Premier League, IN BRIEF, 
http://www.inbrief.co.uk/football-law/premier-league-parachute-payment.htm (last visited Sept. 
28, 2012). 
 100. See id. These contractual provisions can also serve the interests of players. When 
West Ham was demoted at the end of the 2010–2011 season, Senegalese striker Demba Ba 
invoked a release clause in his contract allowing him to leave as a free agent. Jamie Jackson, 
Demba Ba Leaves West Ham and Looks to the Premier League, THEGUARDIAN (Jun. 15, 2011, 
3:41 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/jun/15/demba-ba-west-ham-everton. 
 101. The American Hockey League‘s Chicago Wolves, for example, carry enough local 
support to have a full television package. See Wolves Add 15 Games on My50 Chicago To 
Broadcast Slate, CHICAGOWOLVES.COM, http://www.chicagowolves.com/releases/1398-wolves-
add-15-games-on-my50-chicago-to-broadcast-slate (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
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Interest in minor leagues has a ceiling at the moment precisely because 
so little is at stake, but if the winners of the top minor league in each 
sport were promoted to the majors at the end of the season it would be, 
as they say, a whole different ballgame. 
In sum, the structure of American sports severely restricts potential 
supply for a city that fails to attract or retain one of the incumbent 
franchises, a vital component of league leverage for public subsidies.
102
 
In contrast, systems with promotion and relegation limit monopoly 
power, allowing individual teams to enter or exit according to team 
quality and market demand. That dilutes the power of threats to relocate 
because cities have alternatives. 
C.  Freedom of Movement 
1.  Franchise Relocation in North America 
The term ―franchise free agency‖ became popular in the late 1990s 
after both the Rams and Raiders left Los Angeles for better stadium 
deals in St. Louis and Oakland.
103
 As the term suggests, the major sports 
leagues rarely resist intercity team movement in pursuit of an improved 
handout from politicians. Sometimes a league will even broker such a 
move.
104
 
Many people doubt that franchise free agency could be responsible 
for stadium subsidies for teams like the New York Yankees and the 
Chicago Bears. They believe that it is not credible that teams so closely 
associated with their city could ever leave.
105
 The claim that the 
Yankees will never leave New York is persuasive only ex ante, and only 
if little thought is given to history. Similar claims were made about 
baseball‘s Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants until they 
simultaneously moved to California, whereupon everyone expressed 
great shock.
106
 Or, like the football Giants and Jets, a Yankee exit from 
                                                                                                                     
 102. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 11, at 626–27. 
 103. See Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Antitrust Implications: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 82–112 (1996) (statement of former 
NFL Comm‘r Paul Tagliabue). 
 104. Andrew Zimbalist & Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: Are New Stadiums 
Worth the Cost?, BROOKINGS (1997), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/ 
summer-taxes-noll. 
 105. This objection has been raised on every occasion that the authors have presented this 
Article.  
 106. The 1957 shift of the New York Giants and Brooklyn Dodgers to California provoked 
a bitter and long-lasting reaction that could have threatened the future of the major leagues. 
Even though the Dodgers had long threatened to move, the transfer came as a great shock. When 
the Dodgers moved west, one fan remembers, ―[I]f you were in Behan‘s Bar and Grill, you‘d 
have thought it was a wake. This was like seceding from the [U]nion.‖ CHARLES C. EUCHNER, 
PLAYING THE FIELD: WHY SPORTS TEAMS MOVE AND CITIES FIGHT TO KEEP THEM 17 (1993). 
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New York City might merely be across the Hudson River to reap 
largess from New Jersey. If the Yankees left New York, it would be 
shocking—not because it would be breaking with their traditional home, 
as many teams have done this, but because it would be surprising if 
New York City broke the trend of governments willing to pay for public 
stadiums as a result of such threats. Ex post, the Yankees would be 
added to the long list of movers that no longer shocked people. 
Franchise relocation is a complicated issue for sports leagues. 
Individual franchises have a strong interest in either relocating or 
threatening to relocate as a tool to secure support from local 
government. NFL teams are particularly mobile because league 
members share broadcast revenues equally while each team bears its 
own field expenses if it cannot obtain public defrayment.
107
 Thus, the 
key to improving franchise value is not winning championships but 
obtaining a favorable deal regarding rent and items such as concessions, 
parking, luxury boxes, and personal seat licenses that are unshared with 
other teams.
108
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 107. The $3 billion received by the NFL for its current television contracts are split equally 
by the thirty-two teams over the life of the contract. The credibility of the threat arguably 
depends on the nature of revenue-sharing arrangements in each league, which does vary. Teams 
in the NFL share between 75% and 85% of total league revenues. Until recently, MLB had 
almost the opposite balance, with local revenue contributing between 70% and 80% to a typical 
team‘s total revenue. See VINCE GENNARO, DIAMOND DOLLARS: THE ECONOMICS OF WINNING IN 
BASEBALL 4 (2007). However, under the relatively recent MLB revenue-sharing scheme, all 
thirty teams pay 31% of their local revenues into a common pool to be divided evenly among 
them. David Jacobson, MLB‘s Revenue-Sharing Formula, CBSMONEYWATCH  (Jul. 14, 2008, 
3:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-51210897/mlbs-revenue-sharing-
formula. The NHL has a complex revenue-sharing formula that provides for transfers from the 
top ten teams to the bottom fifteen. The NHL implemented the revenue-sharing system after the 
lockout that led to the cancellation of the 2004–2005 season. The NBA franchises are apparently 
considering dramatically increasing the amount high-revenue teams share with low-revenue 
teams from roughly $60 million to about $150 million per season. Henry Abbott, Sources: 
Owners Talk Revenue Sharing, ESPN.COM (Oct. 25, 2011, 9:36 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7147909/nba-lockout-owners-discussing-revenue-sharing-sou 
rces-say. MLS operates under a hybrid single-entity structure. See Fraser v. Major League 
Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). Technically, MLS owns all teams and other 
assets; however, the operations of each team are managed by a specific owner–investor. Team 
―operators‖ retain 50% of local ticket sales and concessions, the first $1.25 million of local 
broadcast revenues, 100% of overseas tour revenues, and 50% of net revenues from the MLS 
championship game. Id. at 54. 
 108. Except, of course, the Green Bay Packers. Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team 
at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports 
Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2004) (―Unquestionably, it is vital to 
the economic health of an NFL franchise—the viability of the franchise as a business, not the 
quality of the team on the field—to have a state of the art facility.‖). 
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Although teams often have strong incentives to move, their 
colleagues occasionally have an interest in preventing relocation. 
Relocation that reduces the national television audience may be 
profitable for the team but reduces shared revenue from the television 
contract. All of the elite American sporting leagues retain some 
discretion over franchise relocation. However, for reasons which are 
elaborated in Part III, the leagues either cannot or are unlikely to stand 
in the way of opportunistic relocation threats.
 
In fact, one plausible 
explanation for the length of time that the NFL has abandoned the 
valuable L.A. market is that the ―city‘s main value to the league is as a 
threat to hold over cities whose existing teams want new stadiums with 
public subsidies.‖109 
2.  Franchise Continuity in England 
Promotion and relegation fundamentally alters team incentives to 
relocate due to a team‘s substitutability from the perspective of its 
hometown. Attracting public stadium financing is a key business driver 
for American franchises. In England, however, the local environment—
population, wealth, sporting interest, and the like—primarily determines 
whether there will be a soccer team at a particular level (on average) or 
whether the top local team will be promoted to a higher level or 
relegated to a lower one.  
Every large or moderately sized city in England supports multiple 
full-time professional soccer teams—teams playing in the first four tiers 
of the pyramid in addition to a majority of the teams playing in the fifth 
tier and a handful in even lower tiers.
110
 To take just a few examples, 
this season sixteen professional soccer teams play inside London‘s ring 
road, five in the Premier League, and an additional eight 
semiprofessional teams playing in the sixth tier. Being so numerous, 
most teams bear neighborhood names such as Chelsea, Fulham, Leyton, 
Tottenham, or West Ham, and none calls itself London. Greater 
Manchester, a governmental unit with a border roughly encircling the 
city center about fifteen miles out and a population comparable to the 
Tampa SMSA, hosts four Premier League teams and an additional eight 
teams that play in the lower tiers through the sixth tier. Even relatively 
small Blackpool finds five professional teams playing in various tiers 
within twenty miles of its city center. Additional semiprofessional and 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Tim Rutten, Op-Ed., Protecting L.A.‘s Pocket, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/22/opinion/la-oe-rutten-column-football-20110122. 
 110. In distinction to American practice, nothing bars professional English teams from 
playing against semiprofessional or amateur opposition if past performance leads to such a 
configuration. Indeed, that sort of intermixed competition occurs many times each season during 
tournaments that run simultaneously with league play. 
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amateur teams play in even lower tiers, and new promotable teams can 
and do materialize when promoters believe conditions are favorable. 
Importantly, all are potential substitutes for any local team that threatens 
to leave.  
Normalized by area or by population, English teams are much 
denser than their American counterparts. In the age of rail 
transportation, lower English transportation cost, both the explicit ticket 
price and the implicit opportunity cost of travel time, accounted for the 
dissimilar densities.
111
 That a similar team density per unit population 
has not arisen in America in the age of air travel is attributable to the 
absence of promotion and relegation. Lower tier teams are also a more 
effective substitute in England because revenue coverage is broader 
there. A small market English team can survive by achieving occasional 
promotions into higher and more lucrative tiers. Even the most 
successful minor league team in America will never share the rewards 
that the handful of major league teams hold firmly. A minor league 
team must survive year in and year out on minor league attendances, 
minor league broadcast revenues (if any), and handouts from major 
league teams who park young players for experience and then withdraw 
them as soon as they mature. In brief, in the eyes of a host city with 
aspirations to ―major league‖ status, the very best minor league team 
will never seem good enough. Thus, unlike England, American teams 
outside the top tier are not potential substitutes for top tier franchises.  
In England, substitutes abound. Over time, a lower ranking local 
team or a new one will rise to occupy the abandoned niche if a team 
were to move elsewhere. No locale needs to mortgage itself for fear of 
losing league representation at a level its environment can support. As 
evidence, only a single team, Wimbledon, has actually moved to a new 
stadium at any substantial distance removed from its original home. 
Even then, the distance—fifty-six miles, to Milton Keynes—was trivial 
in comparison with the moves American teams undertake.
112
 A new 
                                                                                                                     
 111. See Cain & Haddock, supra note 11, at 1127–30 & fig.1. 
 112. For just a subset of examples from baseball, the Pilots moved nearly 2,000 miles to 
become the Milwaukee Brewers two years after Milwaukee lost the Braves to Atlanta, a move 
of more than 800 miles. See Milwaukee Brewers and Seattle Pilots, BASEBALL ALMANAC, 
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/teams/brewers.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); The Story 
of the Braves, ATLANTA BRAVES, http://atlanta.braves.mlb.com/atl/history/story_of_the 
_braves.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). The Braves of course had moved nearly 1,100 miles to 
get to Milwaukee from Boston in the first place. The Giants moved over 2,900 miles from 
Manhattan to San Francisco; the Dodgers moved nearly 2,800 miles from Brooklyn to Los 
Angeles; the Expos moved nearly 600 miles from Montreal to become the Washington 
Nationals. See Timeline, SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS, http://mlb.mlb.com/sf/history/timeline.jsp 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012); Timeline, LOS ANGELES DODGERS, http://losangeles.dodgers 
.mlb.com/la/history/timeline.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); Franchise Timeline, WASHINGTON 
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team, AFC Wimbledon, formed in 2002 within weeks of the 
announcement of the impending move. The replacement became 
operational so promptly that both clubs claimed to represent Wimbledon 
for a season.  The eighth tier newcomer attracted larger crowds than the 
second tier incumbent, which was forced to rely mainly on travelling 
fans supporting the opponent. AFC Wimbledon has achieved frequent 
promotions and now plays in the fourth tier, from where at the 
conclusion of the present season it could conceivably swap places with 
the now third tier Milton Keynes. That result might be unsurprising 
given that in England the locale‘s environment rather than the team‘s 
franchise is the limiting variable. Although English teams sometimes 
seek public subsidies, they take no retaliatory action when, as 
commonly happens, those requests are rejected. There is no credible 
threat with which to extort stadium subsidies in a system with 
promotion and relegation. 
D.  The Leverage of American Sporting Franchises Reconsidered 
This Article has argued that the closed cartel structure of American 
professional sports enables franchises to coerce frequent and sizable 
stadium investments from local government, whereas the open structure 
of English professional soccer, coupled with the autonomous governing 
authority of the Football Association, goes far to obviate a similar 
pressure. Some recent examples of North American stadium subsidies 
are illustrative. Since 2001, in the NFL alone, taxpayers have provided 
$193 million for Reliant Stadium (Houston Texans),
113
 $251 million for 
CenturyLink Field (Seattle Seahawks),
114
 $219 million for Ford Field 
(Detroit Lions),
115
 $188 million for Lincoln Financial Field 
                                                                                                                     
NATIONALS, http://washington.nationals.mlb.com/was/history/timeline.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 
2012). The Athletics moved over 1,100 miles to their stopover in Kansas City on the way to 
Oakland, an additional trek of 1,800 miles. In football, Kansas City was the receiver (pun 
intended) as the Texans arrived from Dallas, only 500 miles away, to become the Chiefs. Chief‘s 
History—1960s, KANSAS CITY CHIEFS, http://www.kcchiefs.com/team/chiefs-history/1960s.html 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012). The Rams moved over 1,800 miles from Los Angeles to St. Louis, 
which had earlier lost the Cardinals to Phoenix, a move of nearly 1500 miles. T.J. Simers, NFL 
Owners OK Rams‘ Move to St. Louis, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-13/news/mn-54268_1_rams-owner. However, the Cardinals 
had arrived in St. Louis from Chicago, a mere 300 miles away. The Rams are having second 
thoughts about leaving Los Angeles, but they could be beaten to the prize if the Jaguars make a 
2,400 mile move from Jacksonville before the Rams get packed. Of course, nobody is moving to 
Los Angeles unless the city or county puts a proper stadium in place. 
 113. See Reliant Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball. 
com/afc/ReliantStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 114. See CenturyLink Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootba 
ll.com/nfc/CenturyLinkField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 115. See Ford Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/ 
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(Philadelphia Eagles),
116
 $395 million for Soldier Field (Chicago 
Bears),
117
 $285 million for University of Phoenix Stadium (Arizona 
Cardinals),
118
 $612 million for Lucas Oil Stadium (Indianapolis 
Colts),
119
 and $325 million for Cowboys Stadium (Dallas Cowboys).
120
 
This publically reported total, in excess of $2.4 billion, is a significant 
understatement because, as discussed above, much stadium 
subsidization comes in opaque forms that are difficult to assess 
accurately.
121
 
To appreciate the scope of the phenomenon, it is instructive to 
compare the effects of stadium rent-seeking as manifested in stadium 
age. Using stadium age allows us to compare any team in any league. 
Figure 1 shows that stadium ages are consistent with our hypothesis, 
dramatically so.
122
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
nfc/FordField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 116. See Lincoln Financial Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprof 
ootball.com/nfc/LincolnFinancialField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 117. See Soldier Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.co 
m/nfc/SoldierField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 118. See University of Phoenix Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadium 
sofprofootball.com/nfc/UniversityofPhoenixStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 119. See Lucas Oil Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootba 
ll.com/afc/LucasOilStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 120. See Cowboys Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootbal 
l.com/nfc/CowboysStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 121. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 122. The figures summarized by STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, supra notes 113–120, do not 
appear to incorporate the loss of federal tax dollars due to the tax-exempt status of municipal 
bonds. Other sources indicate larger taxpayer expenditures. 
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Figure 1 English Premier League and National Football League 
Stadiums by Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On average, NFL stadiums are nearly twenty-three years old. MLB 
stadiums are nearly twenty-two years old. The 2011-12 season‘s 
Premier League stadiums averaged more than seventy-eight years of 
age. It is not that English soccer teams are unresponsive to local 
changes in population and wealth; rather, they have responded the way 
homeowners most often do when family size grows—they have put up 
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with a bit of inconvenience until matters have become untenable, then 
they have renovated. At zero cost, all teams would prefer brand-new 
structures with a bias toward lucrative corporate hospitality suites, but it 
is very often substantially cheaper to renovate the old than to demolish 
it and start anew. Because English teams, especially the upper tier 
teams, usually must pay the bill, they often forego or postpone the 
attractive alternative because it is not worth the difference in cost.  
Teams in America followed the same practice until enticements 
from cities without teams, such as Milwaukee and Kansas City, 
revealed the other side of the coin. Moreover, teams quickly realized 
that they did not have to wait for a city to identify itself by making the 
first move; a threat to move often induces the local government to 
contribute a substantial part or all of the cost of a new stadium.
123
 Even 
if the ploy fails, the team has placed itself in play, almost invariably 
attracting offers from elsewhere. There is nothing lamentable if natural 
scarcity leads to competition among alternative claimants, but as the 
English experience reveals, a scarcity of potentially high caliber teams 
in America is a product of an artificial cartel, not market forces. It is 
notable that lower tier English teams rarely resort to tear-downs, playing 
in old but renovated structures instead. The average age of the 2011–
2012 season‘s second tier stadiums was sixty-four years; the third tier, 
seventy-five years; the fourth, sixty-eight years; and the fifth, eighty-
three years. Those ages are similar to, and overlap, the ages of Premier 
League stadiums.  
Another test contrasts professional and collegiate stadium ages 
within the United States, an approach that goes beyond providing 
additional data. If we only contrast English with American leagues, the 
differences could merely be a product of omitted variables arising from 
innate geographical, political, or cultural differences. The collegiate 
data allow us to challenge our theory that the relatively closed industrial 
organization of American professional sporting teams—specifically, 
control over entry and placement of teams—enables the lucrative 
stadium rent-seeking that leagues exercise over political units. Colleges 
own the teams they host, and the team‘s fan base consists in important 
part of alumni who would jump ship if the team dared leave the 
university. Being functionally immobile, collegiate teams lack an 
important tool that professional teams possess; they can plead with 
alumni to finance stadium improvements, but they cannot threaten to 
leave, and thus lack a professional team‘s leverage over their host. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 123. For example, the Chicago White Sox secured a $60 million stadium subsidy by 
threatening to move to the Tampa SMSA in 1988. Michael Martinez, White Sox Are Safe at 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 1988, at 45. 
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Figure 2 Stadium Age by Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 summarizes much of the foregoing discussion. It shows the 
average age of sports stadiums in English football and a variety of 
American sports. The contrast between the various tiers of English 
football on the one hand (black bars) and MLB and NFL on the other 
(light gray bars) is striking. The average age of MLB and NFL stadiums 
in 2012 was twenty-two and twenty-three years, respectively, well 
below the median age of U.S. housing stock, college football stadiums 
(gray bars), or English football stadiums. Figure 3 illustrates the same 
data in more detail.  
At more than sixty-seven years, average stadium age in the major 
collegiate conferences—those whose champion qualifies automatically 
for the Bowl Championship Series (BCS)—intermingle with the various 
tiers of English soccer.
124
 In college football, three independent teams 
and the members of five other conferences compete for a chance to play 
in the BCS by meeting specified criteria, though none qualifies 
automatically.
125
 A number of the latter teams have only recently begun 
                                                                                                                     
 124. The automatic BCS qualifying conferences are the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big Ten, 
Big 12, Southeastern, and Pac-12. Independent Notre Dame automatically qualifies by meeting 
defined criteria. See BCS Automatic Qualification, At-Large Eligibility and Selection 
Procedures, 2011–2014 Games, COLLEGEFOOTBALLPOLL, http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/b 
cs_selection_procedures.html (last updated Nov. 25, 2011). 
 125. They are Conference USA, Mid-American, Mountain West, Sun Belt, and 
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playing intercollegiate football or have moved up from lower tiers; 
consequently, their stadiums are relatively new. Even with those 
stadiums included, the overall average age of top tier collegiate 
stadiums is about two-and-one-half times the average age of NFL 
stadiums.
126
 A number of teams that share the relatively new stadium of 
an NFL neighbor or a bowl impart a slight downward bias to the 
collegiate averages.  
Figure 3 shows, in order, the age of every stadium in the Premier 
League, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Football, 
MLB, and NFL. 
 
Figure 3 Age Distribution of Individual Stadiums 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 3, a third of major collegiate teams play in 
stadiums older than Chicago‘s Soldier Field, by far the NFL‘s oldest 
stadium at eighty-seven years. However, Illinois taxpayers view Soldier 
Field as a new structure—we paid extra in order to retain the old façade 
while building a completely new stadium within (or, depending on 
one‘s perspective, above).127 For all practical purposes, the true age of 
                                                                                                                     
Western Athletic, as well as independents Army, Brigham Young, and Navy. Id. 
 126. On average, collegiate football stadiums are about two-and-one-half times as old as 
MLB stadiums as well, and are half again as old as the median U.S. home. 
 127. Lavishly praised by admiring television sportscasters on the inside, various observers 
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Soldier Field is eight years. If we count Jacksonville‘s sixty-five-year-
old field as truly the oldest in the NFL,
128
 then 60% of major collegiate 
teams, including a number of perennial powerhouses,
129
 play in 
stadiums older than any in the NFL.
130
 Clearly, as with English soccer, 
there is nothing intrinsic to American football that spoils the usefulness 
of a stadium after a mere quarter of a century—sports stadiums easily 
outlast residential housing when permitted to do so. 
As in England, colleges renovate their stadiums much more often 
than they tear them down, as evidenced by (among many potential 
examples) Ohio State‘s recent closure of the open end of its famous 
horseshoe with additional seating and Cal‘s present renovation project. 
The same is true for the University of Michigan‘s ―Big House‖, with 
capacity repeatedly expanded from 72,000 in 1927 to 109,901 in 
2010.
131
 
                                                                                                                     
viewing Soldier Field from the outside have called it ―A Flying Saucer Atop a Greek Temple,‖ 
―The Eyesore on the Lake Shore,‖ and several names that ought not be repeated in polite 
company.  
 
The new (renovated) Soldier Field‘s 61,500 seats make it the smallest in the NFL, which 
doubtless will be a complaint when the Bears launch their next stadium demand, though what 
ultimately materializes may well seat even fewer. Soldier Field, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/ 
travel/stadium/_/s/nfl/id/3/soldier-field (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). Immediately prior to 
reconstruction, Soldier Field could seat 8% more Bears fans, 66,946. Historical Timeline of 
Soldier Field, CHICAGO BEARS, http://assets.chicagobears.com/tradition/sf_timeline.asp? (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2012).  
 128. Some would argue that Jacksonville‘s stadium scarcely counts either, given that it was 
so extensively renovated in 1995 at a taxpayer cost of $136 million. See Keating, supra note 6, 
at 14. 
 129. A few examples of those powerhouses—Southern Cal, Nebraska, Notre Dame, 
Clemson, Auburn, Texas, Louisiana State, Oklahoma, Alabama, UCLA, Arkansas, Ohio State, 
Tennessee, Georgia Tech, Wisconsin, and most notably (in our view) Northwestern. 
 130. This would make the average age of an NFL stadium just over twenty-one years. 
Making a similar adjustment for the remade Jacksonville stadium, the average NFL stadium is 
slightly less than twenty years old. 
 131. Stadium History, UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.umich.edu/stadium/history (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2012); Big House Again! Michigan Stadium Capacity Announced at 109,901, 
MGOBLUE.COM (Jul. 14, 2010), http://www.mgoblue.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-
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Though a university‘s campus anchors the football team‘s stadium, 
end-of-season bowl game locations are in the main decision variables 
for the NCAA. Like professional leagues, the NCAA can act as a cartel 
for its member institutions when entertaining bids to host bowls, pitting 
city against city. The NCAA‘s demands are stringent, including 
substantial financial side payments from the host, and the organization 
is sensitive to stadium attributes. As Appendix 2 shows, at thirty-nine 
years old on average, bowl stadiums are nearly twenty-six years 
younger than the home fields of the major conferences.
132
 
The third oldest NFL stadium at fifty-four is Green Bay‘s, unique 
among major professional North American teams in any sport in being a 
non-profit corporation owned by the community, a community thus 
immune to team exit threats. In that regard at least, community 
ownership is a substitute for promotion and relegation. It is notable as 
well that Green Bay, roughly the size of the Premier League‘s 
Blackburn, is by far the smallest American city with a major league 
team. But Green Bay is substantially larger than Burnley, which was 
relegated from the Premier League in 2010. It appears that in addition to 
providing a defense against a team‘s extortionate exit threats, promotion 
and relegation shields against loss of a team merely because the host 
city is small. Just as many major collegiate football teams such as 
Clemson, Penn State, or Texas A&M are found in small, out-of-the-way 
towns, so teams from places like Carlisle, Ipswich, and Oxford 
sometimes play in the top tier of English soccer. 
Whether examining professional English soccer versus major league 
North American stadium age or else internal U.S. data comparing 
collegiate and professional leagues, the data strongly confirm the 
hypothesis that control over league size combined with control over 
entry and exit creates the credible threat that enables stadium rent-
seeking. As the English–American comparison shows, league structure 
can solve that competition problem: promotion and relegation would be 
a solution to stadium rent-seeking. We now examine the feasibility of 
this and other solutions under American antitrust law. 
 
                                                                                                                     
rel/071410aad.html. 
 132. The Rose, Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta Bowls alternate as the site of the BCS national 
championship game. The average age of those four stadiums is virtually identical to the overall 
average. Three stadiums host two bowl games apiece; the overall average falls by one year if 
their ages enter the calculation only once. 
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III.  ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Antitrust and the Industrial Organization of Sporting Leagues 
Federal antitrust law prohibits contracts, combinations, and 
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade.
133
 Though leagues are 
classic cartels in many senses, they have suffered few adverse antitrust 
decisions of any sort, and no one has even attempted seriously to apply 
antitrust law to restrict stadium rent-seeking.
134
 That antitrust law fails 
to curb stadium rent-seeking is not because antitrust is inapplicable to 
sport,
135
 nor because sporting leagues lack market power.
136
 Antitrust 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. 
Med. Soc‘y, 457 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1982) (citing United States v. Joint Traffic Ass‘n, 171 U.S. 
505 (1898) (indicating that as early as 1898, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress could 
not have intended a literal interpretation of the word ―every‖)); Nat‘l Soc‘y of Prof‘l Engineers 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978) (―[R]estraint is the very essence of every contract 
[and if] read literally, § 1 [of the Sherman Act] would outlaw the entire body of private contract 
law.‖); Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co. 
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
 134. See infra Subsection III.B.3 (explaining how the decision in Los Angeles Memorial 
Coliseum may exacerbate the stadium rent seeking problem). 
 135. Baseball has long enjoyed an unusual exemption from antitrust laws. In Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professionall Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that baseball was not the subject of 
interstate commerce because ―[t]he business is giving exhibitions of base ball‖ and thus the 
Sherman Act does not apply. Id. at 208–09. Even if the statement was accurate in 1922 (a 
dubious proposition even then), it is erroneous today given the significant interstate revenues 
attributable to licensing fees and television and the frequency with which fans now travel with 
their team. The editors of Baseball and the American Legal Mind regard Federal Baseball as 
―one of [Justice Holmes‘] most heavily criticized decisions and a source of embarrassment,‖ 
which is a generous understatement. SPENCER WEBER WALLER ET AL., BASEBALL AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 76 (1995). Nonetheless, in Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 
(1953), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that baseball 
remains exempt from antitrust liability. In Flood, the Court recognized that baseball—like other 
sports—is engaged in interstate commerce, but it refused to withdraw baseball‘s exemption, 
relying upon stare decisis. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–85. Thus, for reasons that are entirely 
anomalous, professional baseball has enjoyed virtually a complete exemption from antitrust 
challenges. See EARL W. KINTNER, 1 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 6.2 (1980).  
 136. League representatives argue that they are merely small players in the general 
entertainment market. See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. NFL, 644  F. Supp. 1040, 1057 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining to accept the NFL‘s argument that there is no product market for 
professional football). Each league dominates its respective market segment, however, and has a 
price seeker‘s ability to increase prices by restricting output. Cf. United States v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956 ) (―Monopoly power is the power to control prices or 
exclude competition.‖). And numerous courts have found that sports leagues are sufficiently 
different from other forms of entertainment and that the dominant league exercises market 
power. U.S. Football League, 644 F. Supp. at 1056; Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp 
558, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (―There is no doubt that the NFL currently has a monopoly in the 
United States in major league football.‖); see also Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 531 (7th Cir. 
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law‘s failure is grounded in the necessity of some forms of cooperation 
in a sports league, obscuring the boundary between legitimate and 
illegitimate collusion among franchises,
137
 and the difficulty of fitting 
rent-seeking into a recognizable antitrust cause of action.
138
  
Sporting competitions are adversarial on the playing field but, of 
necessity, cooperative in the boardroom because a well-functioning 
league requires agreement on fundamentals: the rules of the game, 
uniforms, equipment, dates and locations of contests, and the size and 
structure of the competition. In any given year, a fixed game schedule 
necessitates a closed league. Accordingly, most North Americans 
assume that there is no way to have a single top tier league without 
having a cartel. To the contrary, sports leagues throughout most of the 
world demonstrate that a closed league during a competitive season is 
consistent with an open league across a longer period. No justification 
exists for anything beyond a transitory, episodic cartel structure. 
How, then, should courts assess concerted action by individual 
franchises given that it would be impossible to organize a league 
without extensive coordination?
139
 The interdependence of franchises 
has led some courts to view leagues as ―single entities‖ incapable of 
entering into a contract, combination, or conspiracy in violation of § 1 
of the Sherman Act.
140
 However, the Supreme Court rejected that 
defense in the recent American Needle decision.
141
 The Court noted that 
―[t]he fact that NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league 
successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production 
and scheduling of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for 
                                                                                                                     
1986); L.A. Mem‘l Coliseum Comm‘n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); Phila. 
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 137. See infra Section III.A. 
 138. See infra Section III.B. 
 139. See Paul H. Brietzke, Robert H. Bork‘s The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 403 (1979) (book review) (―All league sports . . . rest entirely upon the 
right to boycott.‖); Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, 
The Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV 943, 946–47 
(1988) (―Because organizationally a sports league is not entirely analogous to any other type of 
enterprise, legal doctrines created and developed in more traditional business contexts do not 
easily or always correctly apply to league rules and conduct.‖); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. 
NFL., 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (analyzing concerted action by individual franchise within the 
NFL); JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN PRO TEAM SPORTS 
117–37 (1999). 
 140. See generally Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the 
Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991) (summarizing 
arguments and concluding that the nature of sports leagues does not justify a fundamental 
departure from the antitrust rules applicable to other joint ventures). 
 141. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213. 
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making a host of collective decisions.‖142 Nevertheless, the Court saw 
these justifications for concerted activity as mitigating factors in 
particular instances; such justifications did not forge separate economic 
actors into a single entity to which § 1 of the Sherman Act could never 
be applied.
143
  
Courts generally are suspicious of competitors‘ agreements to raise 
prices or exclude competition, frequently deeming them per se illegal 
regardless of any procompetitive impact.
144
 But courts are not blind to 
the potential benefits of coordinated activity in appropriate cases,
145
 so 
league activities should be scrutinized under a ―Rule of Reason‖ 
standard.
146
 In NCAA v. Board of Regents,
147
 the Supreme Court 
explained that the rule of reason is the more appropriate approach to ―an 
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
product is to be available at all.‖148 
The essence of the rule of reason is that the legality of a business 
practice depends on whether the practice promotes or suppresses 
competition.
149
 The rule of reason enables courts to balance pro-
competitive effects, such as economies of scale, technological 
development, and product integration, against aspects of collaboration 
that appear to foreclose competition. Whereas courts and antitrust 
enforcement agencies once treated partnerships and joint ventures with 
suspicion, there is now a clear recognition that both vertical and 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Id. at 2216.  
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) 
(stating that vertical agreements increase competitive effectiveness and, therefore, are judged 
under the rule of reason, while ―[c]ertain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market 
allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se‖); Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1977) (indicating that vertical restrictions 
reduce intrabrand competition but promote interbrand competition thereby allowing 
manufacturers to compete more effectively against each other); United States v. Topco Assocs., 
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (allocating territories to minimize competition is a horizontal 
restraint which constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act). 
 145. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984). 
 146. See, e.g., L.A. Mem‘l Coliseum Comm‘n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1386–87 (9th Cir. 
1984); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 
F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976); see generally Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant 
Product Market Definition in Sports Franchise Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 
249 n.16 (2000) (―The rule of reason has emerged as the proper test for evaluating sports 
leagues under § 1.‖). 
 147. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 148. Id. at 101. 
 149. Nat‘l Soc‘y of Prof‘l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978); Bd. of 
Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
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horizontal alliances can enhance consumer welfare.
150
 The importance 
of giving due weight to these effects is illustrated by the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
Systems, Inc.
151
 Broadcast Music (BMI) is a performing-rights society 
for musical works; the society offers blanket licenses for a large catalog 
of material, an activity that necessarily involves fixing prices. Although 
price fixing is usually treated as a per se violation, the Supreme Court 
applied a rule of reason analysis and held that BMI‘s integration of 
functions created significant efficiencies and allowed the copyright 
owners to offer, in effect, a different product.
152
 
The obvious potential benefits of integration entailed in some 
partnerships and joint ventures justifies a full comparison with the costs 
of such an arrangement, and differentiates sporting leagues from ―naked 
cartels.‖ However, the mere assertion of such benefits does not shield a 
combination from antitrust scrutiny. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the 
Supreme Court summarized the balance of the law as follows: ―While 
joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws, as Broadcast 
Music indicates, a joint selling arrangement may make possible a new 
product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies.‖153 The NCAA 
characterized its television plan as a cooperative joint venture in a 
similar vein to BMI. The NCAA argued its price-fixing plan assisted 
individual colleges in marketing broadcast rights and was thus pro-
competitive. The Supreme Court disagreed: ―Unlike Broadcast Music‘s 
blanket license covering broadcast rights to a large number of individual 
compositions, here the same rights are still sold on an individual basis, 
only in a noncompetitive market.‖154 As NCAA v. Board of Regents 
indicates, a restraint that is reasonably necessary to achieve the welfare-
enhancing ends of a collaborative effort will not constitute an antitrust 
violation, but the mere invocation of partnership or joint venture is 
insufficient to establish that claim.
155
 
In other words, NCAA v. Board of Regents suggests that it is open to 
a defendant to argue that the closed and anticompetitive structure of 
American sporting is justified by offsetting pro-competitive effects, but 
that such a conclusion is by no means guaranteed. As Parts I and II 
                                                                                                                     
 150. See FED. TRADE COMM‘N & U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 23–25 (2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES]. 
 151. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 152. Id. at 22–24. 
 153. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 154. Id. at 113–14.  
 155. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 150, at 8–9; see also United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 290–91 (6th Cir. 1898), aff‘d, 175 U.S. 211 (1898). 
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established, a smoothly functioning sports league does not require 
endowing incumbents with permanent entry control. The decision to 
operate as a closed league constitutes an agreement to foreclose 
competition by new entrants,
156
 and that in turn gives franchises 
extraordinary leverage to negotiate for ever-greater subsidies. The 
current closed system has enabled teams to leverage credible threats to 
relocate into extraordinary stadium subsidies.
157
 Our empirical evidence 
confirms that the lack of a promotion and relegation system, while not 
the only cause, is a sufficient cause of this dire public choice problem. 
But no matter how direct the line from league structure to stadium rent-
seeking might be, the question still remains whether there is cognizable 
antitrust claim under existing law.  
B.  A Competition Problem Without an Antitrust Solution 
Although it is clear that the closed and anticompetitive structure of 
American sporting leagues enables extraordinary rent-seeking in the 
form of stadium subsidies, it is far from clear that current antitrust law 
provides any remedy. The reason for this disconnect is that antitrust law 
is designed to cure problems in the marketplace but it does not address 
political problems, even those with anticompetitive implications. The 
stadium rent-seeking problem sits oddly at the intersection of political 
and market structures. This Section reviews the three most promising 
antitrust law solutions to stadium rent-seeking and address their 
limitations.  
1.  Collective Boycott 
The closed entry system in American sporting leagues creates 
artificial scarcity of the most extreme kind: it is, for example, literally 
impossible for a city to procure an NFL team to play in its stadium 
without the permission of the majority of existing NFL teams.
158
 This 
absolute scarcity puts the incumbent franchises in a position to make 
credible threats to leave a city in order to extract favorable terms, 
usually in the form of stadium construction or renovation subsidies. 
When such threats are made by a single economic entity, they do not 
constitute an antitrust violation. Although the European Union 
recognizes abuse of a dominant market position as violation of 
competition law, courts and agencies in the United States generally see 
a monopolist charging unreasonably high prices as an invitation to 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 11, at 642. 
 157. Id.; see also Noll, supra note 11; Cain & Haddock supra note 11. 
 158. The same holds true for MLB. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CONST., art. V, § 2(b). 
49
Haddock et al.:  League Structure &Stadium Rent Seeking— the Role of Antitrust Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
50 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
competition and nothing that, by itself, justifies antitrust intervention.
159
 
However, when several economic actors agree between themselves to 
shut out rivals or to refuse to deal with customers or suppliers, except 
on agreed terms, such concerted action generally constitutes an 
unlawful horizontal restraint, specifically a collective boycott.  
The collective boycott argument is as follows: given the artificial 
scarcity of teams and the difficulty of new entry, threats to relocate are 
more than the action of an individual economic entity; rather, every 
threat to relocate is also an implicit threat of a concerted boycott. A 
group boycott exists when individual economic actors agree to refrain 
from dealing with another entity in order to gain some competitive 
advantage, in this case the advantage of favorable subsidies to build or 
renovate new stadiums. 
Although the classic group boycott involves excluding competitors 
from a market, a boycott can also be aimed at customers, suppliers, or 
both. The case of FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association
160
 is 
a close parallel to the situation faced by American cities in their 
dealings with sports franchises.
161
 In that case, a group of lawyers 
agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of 
Columbia Superior Court until the District raised the lawyers‘ pay.162 
The FTC portrayed the lawyers‘ conduct as ―a conspiracy to fix prices 
and to conduct a boycott‖ in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.
163
 The FTC found that a ―coercive, concerted refusal 
to deal had the purpose and effect of raising prices and was illegal per 
se.‖164 The Supreme Court agreed that the concerted action was a plain 
violation of the antitrust laws and should be condemned on a per se 
analysis.
165
 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (―A natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly 
without excluding competitors by improper means is not guilty of ‗monopolizing‘ in violation of 
the Sherman Act . . . and can therefore charge any price that it wants.‖) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 160. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 161. See id. at 414. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 418 (internal quotation omitted). 
 164. Id. at 419 (internal quotation omitted). 
 165. Id. at 436. Although the classic group boycott is considered to be a per se violation of 
the antitrust laws, see NYNEX Corp. v. Discon Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1998), the ―per se 
approach is generally limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or 
customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor,‖ FTC v. Ind. 
Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986). See also N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. 
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293–98 (1985) (addressing the question of when per se 
antitrust analysis is appropriately applied to joint activity susceptible of being characterized as a 
concerted refusal to deal). 
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There is some evidence to bolster the collective boycott theory, at 
least with respect to the NFL. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded almost as much in the Raiders decision when it noted that 
―the League has in the past allowed teams to threaten a transfer to 
another location in order to give the team leverage in lease 
negotiations.‖166 The court found that prior to its dispute with the 
Raiders, the NFL had remained expressly noncommittal when owners 
were renegotiating leases with their respective stadiums.
167
 In addition, 
a statement attributed to NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue also could 
be taken as evidence of an express collective boycott threat. When the 
Houston Oilers threatened to move to Jacksonville, Florida, in 1987, 
Harris County, Texas, responded with $67.5 million in improvements to 
be funded by property tax increases, doubling the county‘s hotel tax, 
and underwriting bonds to be paid over the next thirty years.
168
 Within 
six years, the Oilers began lobbying for a new stadium with club 
seating. Commissioner Tagliabue reportedly warned: ―If the Oilers‘ 
situation doesn‘t work down there, I don‘t see any circumstances in 
which we‘re going to guarantee [Houston] a team, especially when one 
team‘s already found it unsatisfactory.‖169 Translation: If Houston does 
not pay the price demanded by the Oilers, no other NFL team will deal 
with the city. At the end of the 1996 season, the Oilers moved to 
Nashville, where city officials had promised to contribute $144 million 
toward a new stadium.
170
 
More recently, the NFL‘s insistence that L.A. will not be allowed an 
NFL team until it foots the bill for a new stadium could be taken to 
indicate that a concerted boycott of that city is ongoing. It is noteworthy 
that Houston repented of its sin, built a nice new stadium, genuflected 
before the league, and contritely accepted an expansion franchise in 
2002. In contrast, thanks to promotion and relegation, Wimbledon was 
without a team for nary a day when its incumbent leapt across London 
to a suburb on the far side; Houston was without a team for five years 
after its incumbent leapt across Louisiana and Mississippi to Tennessee.  
If proved, such boycotts, and the closed league structure that enables 
them, cannot be justified under a rule of reason standard. There is no 
                                                                                                                     
 166. L.A. Mem‘l Coliseum Comm‘n. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Sports Law—Come Back, Shane: The Movement of Professional Sports Teams, 
http://law.jrank.org/pages/10434/Sports-Law-COME-BACK-SHANE-MOVEMENT-
PROFESSIONAL-SPORTS-TEAMS.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 169. Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, at 104 n.255 (citing John McClain, Tagliabue: City 
Won‘t Get Guarantee, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1996, at C1). 
 170. Garrett Johnson, The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities, 10 U. 
DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 31 (2011). The Oilers are now the Tennessee Titans. See id. at 29. 
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pro-competitive justification for collective negotiation with cities qua 
stadium suppliers. However, the viability of the collective boycott cause 
of action is far from certain. Even assuming that an allegation of a 
concerted boycott was backed up by sufficient evidence to survive the 
post-Twombly pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2),
171
 it faces the argument that there is no antitrust 
injury upon which to base a claim. The core of this objection is that the 
stadium rent-seeking that results from the closed market structure of 
sporting leagues is a political problem, not a market injury.  
Although antitrust law has a broad remit to prevent and remedy 
harms to consumers, it has no role in preventing harm to voters. The 
antitrust laws do not—and because of the First Amendment probably 
could not—take aim at failures of the political process. This objection 
can be framed narrowly along the lines of the Noerr–Pennington 
doctrine which shields certain activity from the scrutiny of antitrust law, 
or more broadly as a fundamental objection that rent-seeking, in spite of 
its obvious harms to the body politic, does not occasion any market 
harms within the remit of antitrust law.  
The Noerr–Pennington doctrine provides that there is no violation 
when competitors jointly petition legislative bodies for laws that are 
anticompetitive.
172
 However, the Noerr–Pennington doctrine is limited 
by its underlying rationale; although it protects businesses as they lobby 
for anticompetitive ends—such as licensing laws and state-sanctioned 
monopolies—the doctrine does not shield anticompetitive means of 
influencing governmental action where the government is acting as a 
market participant. Accordingly, in Trial Lawyers,
173
 a concerted 
boycott aimed at forcing the government of the District of Columbia to 
pay more for legal services was not protected under Noerr–
Pennington.
174
 The doctrine was also found to be inapplicable in Hecht 
v. Pro-Football, Inc.
175
 In that case, would-be competitors to the 
                                                                                                                     
 171. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court held that 
a well-pleaded claim must contain sufficient factual matter ―to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.‖ Id. at 570. The Court held that threadbare recitals of a cause of action‘s 
elements, supported by mere conclusory statements, would be insufficient to meet this standard, 
but cautioned that determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, 
requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense. See id. at 556–57. 
 172. E.R.R.  Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961); 
see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (―Joint efforts to 
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate 
competition.‖). 
 173. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 174. Id. at 428 (―The exceptions derived from Noerr and Claiborne Hardware have no 
application to respondents‘ boycott.‖). 
 175. 444 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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Washington Redskins sought the use of the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium, 
the only suitable venue for professional football in the District of 
Columbia.
176
 The entrants sought to use the stadium at times that would 
not conflict with the Redskins, but the District of Columbia Armory 
Board refused because it had entered into a thirty-year lease prohibiting 
use of the stadium by any professional football team other than the 
Washington Redskins.
177
 The trial court rejected the plaintiff‘s antitrust 
claims in summary judgment on the Noerr–Pennington doctrine.178 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, rejecting ―the facile 
conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers 
exemption.‖179 The court held that absent clear statutory guidance to the 
contrary, federal antitrust laws were applicable to the Amory Board as 
the custodian of the stadium.
180
 
Arguably, even if a plaintiff could demonstrate that the favorable 
terms upon which cities deal with sports franchises were the result of a 
concerted boycott, the harm which results is an injury to taxpayers—an 
injury which does not constitute an antitrust injury because citizens qua 
taxpayers are not consumers. The coordinated rent extraction that is 
facilitated by anticompetitive league structure is not completely 
analogous to the conduct of the trial lawyers in FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Association.
181
 In that case, the District of Columbia was 
the customer, it paid the lawyers‘ fees, and the lawyers were attempting 
coordinated price-fixing in order to extract higher fees.
182
 In the context 
of stadium rent-seeking, any given government entity may not be the 
direct supplier of stadium infrastructure. The complex and opaque 
nature of stadium financing makes this more likely than one might 
presume. Many cities pay for stadiums that they do not technically own. 
For example, Soldier Field in Chicago is owned by the Chicago Park 
District; the Park District is an independent statutory authority and is 
not directly controlled by the City of Chicago.
183
 In 2000, the Illinois 
legislature enacted legislation authorizing a $432 million bond issue for 
the effective demolition and rebuilding of Soldier Field; the bond issue 
was paid for, in part, by a 2% tax on Chicago hotel rooms.
184
 The court 
in the Raiders antitrust litigation drew a distinction between the direct 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. at 933. 
 177. Id. at 932. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 934 (quoting George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. 424 
F.2d 25, 80 (1st Cir. 1970)). 
 180. Id. at 947. 
 181. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 182. Id. at 414. 
 183. See Chicago Park District Act, 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1505/0.01 (1981). 
 184. Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ill. 2003). 
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loss suffered by the L.A. Coliseum and the indirect effects on local 
businesses, finding that the former conferred antitrust standing but the 
latter did not.
185
 In cities where the legal entity controlling the stadium 
and the taxpayers who pay for it are linked only indirectly, an antitrust 
injury may be hard to establish.
186
 
Looking beyond technicalities, a court might reasonably conclude 
that even if the paying political entity happens to be the owner of the 
sports facility (or the land for a new facility), that relationship is merely 
serendipitous. When teams leverage credible threats of relocation in 
order to extract government subsidies, they do not care which taxpayers 
ultimately foot the bill. Thus, even if the leveraged municipality owns 
the relevant stadium, a court may well find that the municipality is 
injured (if at all) as a political entity, not as a supplier of sports 
facilities. In short, courts may well resist attempts to shoehorn a public 
choice injury into the antitrust market regulation framework.  
The significant question here is whether an injury that can be fairly 
characterized as both a market injury and a political injury should be 
automatically removed from the ambit of antitrust law. One could take 
the view that injuries to competition that arise through market 
manipulation should be addressed through the antitrust system 
regardless of their intersection with politics. However, courts anxious to 
avoid controversy are more likely to insist that rent-seeking is an 
essentially political problem that should be resolved through political 
mechanisms. 
2.  League Expansion: Antitrust Claims by Excluded Teams 
If deserted cities are unable (or unwilling) to pursue a collective 
boycott claim against an anticompetitive league, there is little prospect 
that a would-be new entrant would succeed either. Under a system of 
promotion and relegation, a city can replace a top tier team with a lower 
division team or even a new team. With sufficient financial backing to 
obtain quality players and coaching staff, the new team will ascend to 
top tier in a matter of a few years.
187
 Under the American system, a city 
can only replace a lost team if the league decides to allow it. One 
solution to the problem of restricted entry would simply be to force the 
leagues to expand and admit new teams.
188
 Whatever the merits of this 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See L.A. Mem‘l Coliseum Comm‘n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 186. Id. 
 187. With a high enough win rate, it would take only one season to take a team from the 
Championship Division to the Premier League; two from League One; and so on. 
 188. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Sports 
Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1679 (1996) (arguing that leagues could be required to undergo 
―reasonable expansion‖ under either the essential facilities doctrine or the ancillary restraints 
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proposal might be as a matter of social policy, it seems far-fetched as an 
antitrust case. For a court to order league expansion as a remedy, there 
would have to be an underlying violation. If the claimed violation is 
simply that the decision by the league not to admit a given team was 
unjustified, leagues have very little cause for concern.  
Two cases, Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League
189
 and 
Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League,
190
 are 
illustrative. The Memphis Southmen were a member of the ill-fated 
World Football League in 1974 and 1975.
191
 When the World Football 
League disbanded halfway through the 1975 season, the Southmen 
rebranded as the Memphis Grizzlies and sought admission to the 
NFL.
192
 At the time, the NFL had no franchise at Memphis, and a home 
team designation for that location would not infringe upon the home 
territory of any NFL member.
193
 When the Grizzlies‘s application was 
rejected by the NFL, the team‘s owners sued, alleging that the rejection 
was made pursuant to a conspiracy and that it amounted to an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, or a group boycott.
194
  
Seattle Totems Hockey Club is more convoluted, as it involves the 
interactions of three separate hockey leagues: the dominant National 
Hockey League (NHL) and two would-be competitors, the Western 
Hockey League (WHL)—a minor league based in Canada—and the 
World Hockey Association (WHA), based in New York.
195
 The NHL 
doubled in size for the 1967–1968 season196 and then added teams in 
Vancouver and Buffalo in 1970. This expansion was driven by the 
league‘s desire to expand its television audience, but also to suppress 
the WHL‘s threat to turn itself into a major league. In 1972, the NHL 
added teams in New York and Atlanta to stave off the threat of 
competition from the newly formed WHA. In June 1974, the NHL 
voted to award a conditional Seattle franchise to the owners of the 
Seattle Totems, a team that was then part of the minor league WHL.
197
 
The Totems did not seek or receive a WHA franchise.
198
 The Totems 
had been slated to play in the NHL in the 1976–1977 season; however, 
                                                                                                                     
doctrine). 
 189. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 190. 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 191. Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 776. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 776–77. The Grizzlies‘ complaint was filed on December 3, 1979. 
 195. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 1349. 
 196. Adding teams in Los Angeles, Minnesota, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Oakland, and St. 
Louis. 
 197. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 1349. 
 198. Id. 
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the conditional franchise for Seattle expired because the owners of the 
team did not fulfill the NHL‘s conditions.199 The Totems claimed that 
their failure to receive an NHL franchise amounted to a violation of § 2 
of the Sherman Act.
200
 They alleged ―a grand scheme on the part of the 
NHL to destroy the WHA by promising franchises to WHL teams so 
that those teams would not join the WHA.‖201 
Mid-South Grizzlies and Seattle Totems Hockey Club illustrate the 
quixotic nature of antitrust suits aimed at compelling a particular league 
to admit a particular team. Such lawsuits are bound to fail because of 
the complexity of determining optimal league size and composition.
202
 
Sport is worth watching precisely because outcomes are the result of 
skill differentials, but nonetheless the outcome remains uncertain 
beforehand. Uncertainty produces excitement. More precisely, the 
excitement level of games is a function of two components of league 
size: parity and variety.
203
 Parity is important because games are not 
exciting if teams are mismatched and it is obvious who will win. 
However, excessive parity can lead to a perception of mediocrity and a 
longing for the good old days of superstar players and dynastic teams.
204
 
Likewise, it is generally more interesting to watch Team A play Team C 
than it would be to see them play Team B a second time. Moreover, if A 
plays B too often, latent differences in parity will become more obvious. 
In theory, there will be an optimal league size for any given sport, and, 
if a league should expand, there will be an expansion team that is 
preferable to all others. However, in practice, as the plaintiffs in Mid-
South Grizzlies and Seattle Totems Hockey Club discovered, it is very 
difficult for any individual would-be entrant to establish that their 
application was rejected for anticompetitive reasons and not in the 
interests of maintaining optimal league size, parity, or some other 
structural considerations.
205
 The incumbent franchises will argue, quite 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1350. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits monopolizing or 
combining and conspiring to monopolize any part of trade or commerce. Sherman Antitrust Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890). 
 201. Id. at 1350. 
 202. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1983); Seattle 
Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 1350. 
 203. Cain & Haddock, supra note 11, at 1130–31. Other structural factors influence parity 
as well, most obviously revenue sharing, salary caps, and inter-team wealth transfers. 
 204. See Daniel Mizak et al., Assessing Alternative Competitive Balance Measures for 
Sports Leagues: A Theoretical Examination of Standard Deviations, Gini Coefficients, the Index 
of Dissimilarity, 12 ECON. BULL. 1, 1 (2005), available at http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/eb/ 
2005/volume12/EB-04L80002A.pdf. 
 205. See Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786; Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 
1351. 
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credibly, that they understand the nature of their sport and the optimal 
league size better than a court could hope to.
206
  
3.  Reverse Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL
207
 
A 1984 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision considerably 
weakened the power of the NFL (and possibly other leagues) to prohibit 
franchise relocations. In 1978, the Rams decided to vacate the Los 
Angeles Coliseum for a better deal in suburban Anaheim.
208
 The 
Coliseum attempted to lure the Oakland Raiders as replacement 
tenants.
209
 However, because of the proximity of Anaheim to Los 
Angeles, the city was still designated as part of the Rams‘ territory.210 
Without the permission of the Rams, the addition of a new league 
member within their territory required three-quarters approval of all 
twenty-eight teams under the NFL rules.
211
 The other teams voted 
twenty-two to zero to oppose the move.
212
 Following the vote, the 
Raiders joined the Coliseum in an antitrust complaint against the other 
members of the NFL.
213
 
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National 
Football League (Raiders),
214
 the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict 
that the NFL‘s relocation restriction violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.215 
                                                                                                                     
 206. This does not mean that incumbents actually set the league size according to socially 
optimal considerations, merely that the complexity of these considerations provides cover for 
whatever their true motives may be.  
 207. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 208. Id. at 1384. 
 209. Id. at 1385. 
 210. Id. 
 211. At the time, Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution demanded ―unanimous 
approval of all 28 teams of the League‖ before a team could relocate into a rival‘s territory. Id. 
at 1384. 
 212. Id. at 1385. There were five abstentions and the Raiders did not get to vote. SEAN 
LAHMAN, THE PRO FOOTBALL HISTORICAL ABSTRACT: A HARDCORE FAN‘S GUIDE TO ALL-TIME 
PLAYER RANKINGS 44 (2008). 
 213. The City of Oakland also attempted unsuccessfully to use its power of eminent 
domain to retain the Raiders. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 845 (Cal. 
1982). 
 214. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Raiders]. 
 215. It is unclear whether a decision by the MLB to block franchise relocation would fall 
within the scope of baseball‘s judge-made antitrust exemption. In the only case directly on 
point, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to dismiss a challenge to baseball‘s franchise 
relocation restrictions but held that the scope of the exemption was limited to baseball‘s reserve 
system. Piazza v. MLB, 831 F.Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (alleging that the MLB frustrated 
their efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants and relocate the team to the Tampa SMSA); 
see also Butterworth v. Nat‘l League of Prof‘l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994). But 
see McCoy v. MLB, 911 F.Supp. 454, 456–58 (W.D. Wash. 1995); New Orleans Pelicans 
Baseball, Inc. v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Prof‘l Baseball Leagues, Inc., 1994 WL 631144, at *8–9 (E.D. 
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The appellate court agreed that the restraint caused significant harm to 
competition and that less restrictive means could have achieved any 
benefits.
216
 Subsequently, the NFL has been reluctant to block 
relocation, even when detriment to the league is apparent.
217
 Franchise 
relocation restrictions are not invalid per se under the decision, but are 
subject to a ―rule of reason‖ balancing test.218 However, the decision 
had a substantial impact, as illustrated in 1995 when the NFL owners 
chose to allow the Rams to move (again) to St. Louis after the Attorney 
General of Missouri threatened to seek billions of dollars in punitive 
damages if permission was denied.
219
 The owners had initially voted 
against the move, but relented to avoid the risk of treble antitrust 
damages.
220
 Consequently, many commentators have suggested that the 
solution is less antitrust regulation. Specifically, they suggest giving 
leagues antitrust immunity with respect to collective decisions regarding 
relocation.
221
  
It is unlikely that merely giving the leagues an antitrust free pass in 
this respect would address the problem. Rodney Fort provides the 
sobering assessment that ―leagues carefully husband viable alternative 
threat locations‖ to enable teams endowed with market power to offer 
all-or-nothing propositions to host cities.
222
 The individual franchises 
                                                                                                                     
La. 1994). See generally Jeffrey Gordon, Baseball‘s Antitrust Exemption And Franchise 
Relocation: Can A Team Move? 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201 (1999) (arguing that the baseball 
exemption extends to the business of baseball, and thus includes franchise relocation rules). In 
1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, revoking baseball‘s antitrust exemption with respect 
to labor relations. 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b. The Act does not affect the scope of baseball‘s antitrust 
exemption with respect to ―franchise expansion, location or relocation,‖ nor does it indicate that 
those things are within the scope of the exemption. Id. § 26b(b)(3). The passage of the Curt 
Flood Act either eviscerates the baseball exemption or, more likely, belies the Piazza court‘s 
claim that the exemption extends only to the reserve clause. See J. Philip Calabrese, Antitrust 
and Baseball, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 531, 538 (1999). 
 216. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1395 (―Exclusive territories insulate each team from competition 
within the NFL market, in essence allowing them to set monopoly prices to the detriment of the 
consuming public. The rule also effectively foreclosed free competition among stadia such as 
the Los Angeles Coliseum that wish to secure NFL tenants . . . . If the transfer is upheld, direct 
competition between the Rams and Raiders would presumably ensue to the benefit of all who 
consume the NFL product in the Los Angeles area.‖). 
 217. See Nottingham, supra note 108, at 1076. 
 218. See NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 567–68 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 219. Nottingham, supra note 108, at 1075. 
 220. Id. at 1076. On the impact of the decision, see Travis T. Tygart, Antitrust‘s Impact on 
the National Football League and Team Relocation, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 29, 31–34 (2000); see 
also John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of Owners, Cities, Leagues and Congress, 5 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 83 (1994). 
 221. See, e.g., Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, at 138–39. 
 222. Rodney D. Fort, Stadium Votes, Market Power and Politics, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 419, 
419 (1999). 
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will oppose relocation only if that will diminish their own revenues. 
Though that will be clear with some opportunistic moves, it will not be 
in others. Furthermore, although some franchise relocations may be 
narrowly detrimental, they are nonetheless useful examples of the 
wages of host resistance. Other teams have some incentive to stand 
aside and allow a move because it strengthens their own future 
threats.
223
 Finally, a relocation fee paid to the league can overcome 
resistance by other league members.
224
 As such, it is unsafe to assume 
that giving greater antitrust immunity to leagues will result in less rather 
than more harm to consumers and taxpayers. 
4.  The Question of Remedies 
For the reasons we have already discussed, there is every reason to 
believe that a system of promotion and relegation would produce 
superior sporting competitions and substantially reduce, if not eliminate, 
the stadium rent-seeking problem to which this article is addressed. 
However, as reviewed in this Part, the problems caused by the 
anticompetitive structure of American sporting leagues do not 
necessarily lend themselves to solutions based in antitrust law. Even if 
they did, one must address the question of whether the court ordered 
imposition of a system of promotion and relegation is a viable remedy.  
As a remedy, promotion and relegation is similar to, but distinct 
from, the more drastic step of breaking up sporting leagues. A number 
of commentators have advocated breaking professional sports leagues 
into multiple independent entities.
225
 Professor Stephen Ross argues that 
judicially ordered divestiture would be an appropriate remedy for 
correcting unlawful monopolization by a professional sports league.
226
 
However, a simple breakup ignores the natural desire of sports fans to 
compare the best against the best. As such, the proposal runs counter to 
the history of professional sports, which has been one of increasing 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, at 104 (―There is no reason to expect that franchise 
owners routinely will interfere with their joint-venturers‘ efforts to make more money at the 
taxpayers‘ expense.‖) (quoting Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 
643, 654 (1989)). 
 224. See Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 146, at 246 n.6 (―Some commentators have 
suggested that the real reason the [NFL] approved the Rams‘ move to St. Louis was because the 
Rams agreed to pay the NFL a $71 million ‗relocation fee.‘‖) (citing Sanjay José Mullick, 
Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 1, 11 & n.55 (1996) (noting that the owners originally voted twenty-one to three 
(with five abstentions) against the Rams move, but then voted twenty-three to six in favor, after 
being offered the relocation fee)). 
 225.  See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE 
SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS 333 (2000); Ross, supra note 223, at 715–33. 
 226. Ross, supra note 223, at 646. 
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consolidation.
227
 History shows that the sports market is unlikely long to 
sustain multiple top tier leagues within a given sport.
228
 It is also hard to 
see how depriving the sporting public of the pinnacle of competition 
would be consistent with promoting consumer welfare. 
In contrast to simply breaking up monopolistic sporting leagues, 
imposing a system of promotion and relegation would address the 
credible threat problem we have identified but leave all other aspects of 
decision making to the teams themselves. Courts favoring structural 
remedies seek to address the fundamental causes of illegal conduct in a 
way that does not require ongoing court supervision: they seek, in other 
words, to ―pry open to competition a market that has been closed by 
defendants‘ illegal restraints.‖229 However, although structural remedies 
may appear to be preferable to behavioral ones—given the difficulty of 
adapting injunctions to changing market conditions
230—the recent trend 
in antitrust law has been away from structural remedies. At least since 
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
231
 structural remedies have fallen out 
of favor with courts, commentators, and government agencies because 
structural remedies may be just as likely to create inefficiencies that 
harm consumers as was the antitrust violation complained of.
232
 In 
particular, even if a court were convinced of the benefits of promotion 
and relegation (which it should be) it may nevertheless be wary of the 
transitional costs of moving from the current system.  
To summarize, it is far from clear that antitrust law offers good 
solutions to the problems caused by the closed and anticompetitive 
structure of American sporting leagues. As set forth above, a court 
could quite reasonably (although not inevitably) take the view that the 
stadium rent-seeking resulting from the closed market structure of 
sporting leagues is essentially a political problem and not a market 
injury. Likewise, at the remedy stage, a court might be reluctant to take 
on the task of determining the best way to transition from current league 
cartels to a system of open competition through promotion and 
relegation. The ambiguity as to whether this is a market problem or a 
political problem combined with the uncertainty as to the appropriate 
                                                                                                                     
 227. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 921, 935 (2001) (reviewing PAUL C. 
WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS 
(2000)). 
 228. See Edelman, supra note 75, at 301. 
 229. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577–78 (1972) (quoting Int‘l Salt Co. 
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)) (internal quotation omitted). 
 230. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 88 
(2009); see also U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES 7 n.12 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf. 
 231. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 232. Id. at 49. 
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remedy given potential transition costs may well counsel abstention in 
favor of a political solution. Obviously, however, neither of those 
reasons should deter Congress from taking steps to address the distorted 
market structure that enables franchises to hold American cities hostage 
to extravagant demands for subsidies.  
A system of promotion and relegation is just one solution Congress 
should consider, but it would be less radical than simply breaking up 
existing leagues.
233
 Imposing a system of promotion and relegation on 
American sporting leagues would have significant benefits beyond 
addressing the public choice problem of stadium rent-seeking.  
CONCLUSION 
The end of the season is a dreary affair for the teams at the bottom 
of the NFL and NBL ladders. By contrast, the end of the season in a 
promotion and relegation system sets hearts racing at both ends of the 
table.  
Roy Hodgson took over as the coach of struggling Fulham FC on 
December 30, 2008, halfway through the 2008–2009 English Premier 
League Season.
234
 The team improved under Hodgson, but still looked 
bound to be relegated with three games to go. To avoid relegation, 
Fulham had to win all three games and hope for favorable results in 
other matches. In that third to last game, with twenty minutes 
remaining, the team was down 0–2 away against this year‘s current 
leaders, Manchester City.
235
 At this point, due to results in other 
matches, Fulham were mathematically relegated—if results stayed the 
same, it was out of the top competition. Hodgson substituted the much 
maligned Diomansy Kamara at halftime; the two goals he went on to 
score in the second half were instrumental in Fulham‘s astonishing 3–2 
comeback. Fulham then won their next match against another struggling 
team, Birmingham City, putting it in relegation danger. On the final day 
of the season Fulham faced off against Portsmouth. But it would not be 
enough to avoid relegation for Fulham to beat Portsmouth—their fate 
also depended on what happened in other games being played 
simultaneously on the final day of the season. 
Joining Fulham at the bottom of the table were four teams facing 
potential relegation that happened to be playing one another in the final 
round: Derby versus Reading, and Birmingham versus Blackburn. At 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Changes to the tax code and the laws relating to municipal bonds may also alleviate 
the public choice problems we have identified in this Article; they are, however, beyond its 
scope. For a discussion of tax related issues, see, for example, Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, 
at 144–48. 
 234. The team was then ranked nineteenth out of twenty.  
 235. The team which is leading the EPL as this paragraph is being written.  
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3:15 p.m., James Harper scored a goal against Derby, lifting Reading 
out of the relegation zone. Birmingham fans listening on their radios 
while watching their own game became feverish with anxiety; but 
seventeen minutes later, David Murphy scored for Birmingham, placing 
them 1–0 ahead of Blackburn. Even then, to avoid relegation, 
Birmingham needed Derby to defeat Reading. At 4:09 p.m., Blackburn 
drew level with Birmingham at 1–1, thanks to a goal from Morten 
Gamst Pedersen. At this stage, Fulham and Birmingham were set for 
relegation along with Derby. This standing was made all the more likely 
when Dave Kitson scored a second goal for Reading at 4:19 p.m. Then 
Cameron Jerome scored for Birmingham at 4:33 p.m., making the score 
2–1, but the insufficiency of this result was confirmed when Kevin 
Doyle put Reading 3–0 ahead moments later. Then, at 4:35 p.m., with 
less than fifteen minutes of regular time remaining, Fulham‘s Danny 
Murphy scored a fantastic header inside the penalty box and the score 
remained 1–0 at full time. Fulham had survived the season, beating out 
Reading on goal difference, despite its sensational 4–0 victory.236 
Back home, in contrast, the end of the season is at best irrelevant for 
most American teams who are out of contention; at worst, there are 
actually perverse incentives at the bottom of the table—the worse that a 
team performs, the better its pick in the draft for next year.
237
 In 2011, 
multiple teams had been counseled to perform as badly as possible, to 
―suck for Luck‖—that is, to aim to be the bottom team so as to have the 
first pick of the draw and thus a chance to draft Andrew Luck, 
Stanford‘s exceptional quarterback.238 The draft system is not simply a 
form of salary capping—it is a necessary device given that there is no 
promotion and relegation. Without relegation, there is no way to get rid 
of poorly performing teams. Short of allowing some teams to simply get 
worse and worse but nonetheless stay in league, it is necessary to have 
this artificial system of equalization. But there exists an alternative 
system for managing team quality that simultaneously avoids the costly 
rents of multimillion or even billion-dollar taxpayer funded sporting 
stadiums: promotion and relegation. 
The economic and legal literature thoroughly documents the 
consequence and extent of public spending by American cities for the 
                                                                                                                     
 236. How the Battle to Avoid relegation Unfolded, THE GUARDIAN, May 11, 2008, at 9.  
 237. In the NFL, the worst team gets the best draft pick. Poor performance is rewarded in a 
more indirect fashion in other leagues. In MLB the top three draft picks are randomly allocated 
among the fourteen teams that did not make the playoffs the year before. 
 238. See Steve Politi, ‗Suck for Luck‘ Could Be Best Hope for NFL‘s Worst,  CNN.COM 
(Oct. 21, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/us/suck-for-luck-could-be-best-
hope-for-nfls-worst/index.html. 
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private benefit of professional sporting franchises.
239
 New stadiums 
arise from the rubble of not-so-old ones, at public expense, often before 
the public has paid off the debt incurred for the previous model. That is 
a consequence of the extraordinary leverage that American leagues hold 
over cities, a fact that many commentators have understood without 
properly diagnosing the source. 
The frequency of team movements and magnitude of public 
handouts in America in comparison with England cannot arise solely 
from passionate public interest in sports or the frailty of the political 
process. Nor is the ability of teams to move the culprit. Avid sporting 
interest, imperfect political systems, and team mobility characterize 
both America and England. The characteristics manifest themselves in 
extraordinary ways in America because of the exceptional 
organizational structure of American leagues: closed entry severely 
restricts team supply and enables incumbents to make credible threats to 
relocate. That stimulates offers of better terms from rival cities that have 
no team, and a host city wishing to avoid the team‘s exit must match or 
exceed the rival offers. An English team could make the same threat, 
but it would be hollow, as the birth of AFC Wimbledon has 
demonstrated. The relative openness fostered by promotion and 
relegation shields localities from extortion; local fans have at hand a 
ready option to shift allegiance to a different local team, and by so 
doing to push it up the ranks. American fans have no assured substitutes 
if the local team leaves, and thus possess a much weaker weapon 
against credible threats, not merely of departure but of long-term 
deprivation, as the NFL has pointedly taught Los Angeles residents for 
the past sixteen years.  
This Article has applied a comparative insight to shed new light on 
the much-lamented problem of stadium rent-seeking. The insight is 
simple: English football shows that major sports leagues do not require 
absolute control over league composition. The closed cartel system is a 
poor option in comparison to an automatic, episodically open, 
promotion and relegation system.  
Professional American sporting leagues have been cartels for so 
long that this artificial structure has taken on the appearance of 
normality, a false premise that distorts antitrust analysis. A comparison 
with English soccer demonstrates that cooperation on some aspects of 
competition does not necessitate cooperation on all aspects. With that 
evident, the illegitimacy of cartels threatening collective boycotts 
against cities unless they play the subsidy game becomes transparent. 
However, even though the closed structure of the American leagues is 
                                                                                                                     
 239. See supra Part I. 
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clearly, in the normal sense of the word, a competition problem, it may 
not be amenable to an antitrust law solution.  
Stadium rent-seeking occurs at the intersection of flawed political 
and market structures. Courts may well take the view that although 
franchise leverage is an artifact of a distorted market, the injury in the 
form of public subsidies is political in nature and not within the scope of 
antitrust law. Given the logistical issues to be resolved in transitioning 
from the existing cartel to open competition through promotion and 
relegation, it would be best if Congress rather than the courts tackled the 
issue. Promotion and relegation is not the only conceivable remedy for 
stadium rent-seeking, but it would elegantly restructure incentives of the 
incumbents without interfering with internal franchise decisions that are 
not merely benign but beneficial.  
Imagine an American team earning its place at the top table through 
sporting achievement while its fans and sponsors pay for the field on 
which the team plays, sparing other taxpayers who could hardly care 
less about the team‘s performance. That sounds almost like English 
soccer. It would not be such a bad thing.  
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Appendix 1 
NFL & Bowl Championship Series College Football Team 
Stadiums—2012 Season 
Legend Updated 19 Sept. 
2011 
Stadium of National Football League Team 
Stadium of NCAA Football Team from Automatically Qualifying BCS 
Conference 
Stadium of NCAA Football Team From Non-Automatically Qualifying BCS Eligible 
Conference 
 
Team Year Opened Age  Notes 
New York 
Giants 
2010 1 NFL shared w. Jets 
New York Jets 2010 1 NFL shared w. Giants 
Dallas 
Cowboys 
2009 2 NFL shared w. Cotton Bowl 
U of 
Minnesota 
2009 2 Big 10  
Indianapolis 
Colts 
2008 3 NFL  
Central 
Florida 
2007 4 C USA  
Arizona 
Cardinals 
2006 5 NFL shared w. Fiesta Bowl 
Stanford 2006 5 PAC 12  
Philadelphia 
Eagles 
2003 8 NFL shared w. Temple 
Temple 2003 8 MAC shared w. Eagles 
U Conn 2003 8 Big 
East 
 
Detroit Lions 2002 9 NFL  
Houston 
Texans 
2002 9 NFL shared w. Texas Bowl 
New England 
Patriots 
2002 9 NFL shared w. U Mass at Amherst 
U Mass at 
Amherst 
2002 9 MAC shared w. Patriots 
Seattle 
Seahawks 
2002 9 NFL  
Denver 
Broncos 
2001 10 NFL  
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Pittsburgh 
Steelers 
2001 10 NFL shared w. Pitt 
Pitt 2001 10 Big 
East* 
shared w. Steelers   *Impending 
move to ACC 
Cincinnati 
Bengals 
2000 11 NFL  
Southern 
Methodist 
2000 11 C USA shared w. Armed Forces Bowl 
Cleveland 
Browns 
1999 12 NFL  
Tennessee 
Titans 
1999 12 NFL shared w. Music City Bowl 
Baltimore 
Ravens 
1998 13 NFL  
Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers 
1998 13 NFL shared w. South Florida & 
Outback Bowl 
South Florida 1998 13 Big 
East 
Shared w. Buccaneers & Outback 
Bowl 
Middle 
Tennessee 
1998 13 Sun 
Belt 
 
Louisville 1998 13 Big 
East 
 
Utah 1998 13 PAC 12  
Washington 
Redskins 
1997 14 NFL  
Carolina 
Panthers 
1996 15 NFL  
St. Louis 
Rams 
1995 16 NFL  
Florida 
International 
1995 16 Sun 
Belt 
 
Rutgers 1994 17 Big 
East 
 
Suny at 
Buffalo 
1993 18 MAC  
UT San 
Antonio 
1993 18 WAC shared w. Alamo Bowl 
Atlanta 
Falcons 
1992 19 NFL  
Marshall 1991 20 C USA  
Miami 
Dolphins 
1987 24 NFL shared w. U of Miami (Florida) 
& Orange Bowl 
U of Miami 1987 24 ACC shared w. Dolphins & Orange 
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(Florida) Bowl 
Miami 
University 
(Ohio) 
1983 28 MAC  
Minnesota 
Vikings 
1982 29 NFL  
Texas State 1981 30 WAC  
Fresno State 1980 31 Mtn W  
Syracuse 1980 31 Big 
East* 
*Impending move to ACC 
West Virginia 1980 31 Big 
East 
 
Louisiana at 
Monroe 
1978 33 Sun 
Belt 
 
New Mexico 
State 
1978 33 WAC  
Southern 
Mississippi 
1976 35 C USA  
New Orleans 
Saints 
1975 36 NFL shared w. Tulane & Sugar & 
New Orleans Bowls 
Tulane 1975 36 C USA shared w. Saints & Sugar & New 
Orleans Bowls 
Idaho 1975 36 WAC  
Hawaii 1975 36 Mtn W shared w. Hawai‘i & NFL Pro 
Bowls 
Iowa State 1975 36 Big XII  
Arkansas 
State 
1974 37 Sun 
Belt 
 
Buffalo Bills 1973 38 NFL  
Kentucky 1973 38 SEC  
Kansas City 
Chiefs 
1972 39 NFL  
Central 
Michigan 
1972 39 MAC  
Washington 
State 
1972 39 PAC 12  
UNLV 1971 40 Mtn W shared w. Las Vegas Bowl 
Louisiana at 
Lafayette 
1971 40 Sun 
Belt 
 
Boise State 1970 41 Mtn W shared w. Famous Idaho Potato 
Bowl 
Eastern 
Michigan 
1969 42 MAC  
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Kent State 1969 42 MAC  
Louisiana 
Tech 
1968 43 WAC  
Utah State 1968 43 WAC  
Western 
Kentucky 
1968 43 Sun 
Belt 
 
Kansas State 1968 43 Big XII  
Wake Forest 1968 43 ACC  
Ball State 1967 44 MAC  
Memphis 1967 44 C USA shared w. Liberty Bowl 
Colorado 
State 
1967 44 Mtn W  
Oregon 1967 44 PAC 12  
San Diego 
Chargers 
1968 43 NFL shared w. San Diego St & 
Holiday & Poinsettia Bowls 
San Diego 
State 
1967 44 Mtn W shared w. Chargers & Holiday & 
Poinsettia Bowls 
Oakland 
Raiders 
1966 45 NFL  
Bowling 
Green 
1966 45 MAC  
Nevada 1966 45 Mtn W  
North 
Carolina 
State 
1966 45 ACC  
Northern 
Illinois 
1965 46 MAC  
Virginia Tech 1965 46 ACC  
BYU 1964 47 IND  
East Carolina 1963 48 C USA  
UTEP 1963 48 C USA shared w. Sun Bowl 
Air Force 1962 49 Mtn W  
San Francisco 
49ers 
1960 51 NFL  
New Mexico 1960 51 Mtn W shared w. New Mexico Bowl 
Indiana 1960 51 Big 10  
Penn State 1960 51 Big 10  
Florida 
Atlantic 
1959 52 Sun 
Belt 
 
Navy 1959 52 SEC  
Arizona State 1958 53 PAC 12 shared w. Insight Bowl 
Green Bay 
Packers 
1957 54 NFL  
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Boston 
College 
1957 54 ACC  
Oregon State 1953 58 PAC 12  
North Texas 1952 59 Sun 
Belt 
 
Rice 1950 61 C USA  
Troy State 1950 61 Sun 
Belt 
 
Wyoming 1950 61 Mtn W  
Baylor 1950 61 Big XII  
Florida State 1950 61 ACC  
Maryland 1950 61 ACC  
South 
Alabama 
1948 63 Sun 
Belt 
shared w. Senior & GoDaddy 
Bowls 
Texas Tech 1947 64 Big XII  
Jacksonville 
Jaguars 
1946 65 NFL shared w. Gator Bowl 
Houston 1946 65 C USA  
Clemson 1942 69 ACC  
Akron 1940 71 MAC  
Auburn 1939 72 SEC  
Arkansas 1938 73 SEC  
Toledo 1937 74 MAC  
Western 
Michigan 
1937 74 MAC  
South 
Carolina 
1934 77 SEC  
San Jose State 1933 78 WAC  
Virginia 1931 80 ACC  
Tulsa 1930 81 C USA  
Florida 1930 81 SEC  
Notre Dame 1930 81 SEC  
Texas 
Christian 
1930 81 Big 
East 
 
Ohio 1929 82 MAC  
Alabama 1929 82 SEC  
Arizona 1929 82 PAC 12  
Duke 1929 82 ACC  
Georgia 1929 82 SEC  
Iowa 1929 82 Big 10  
Texas A&M 1929 82 Big XII  
Alabama at 
Birmingham 
1927 84 C USA shared w. BBVA Compass Bowl 
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Michigan 1927 84 Big 10  
North 
Carolina 
1927 84 ACC  
Missouri 1926 85 Big XII  
Northwestern 1926 85 Big 10  
Chicago Bears 1924 87 NFL  
Army 1924 87 IND  
Colorado 1924 87 PAC 12  
Louisiana 
State 
1924 87 SEC  
Purdue 1924 87 Big 10  
Texas 1924 87 Big XII  
California 1923 88 PAC 12  
Illinois 1923 88 Big 10  
Michigan 
State 
1923 88 Big 10  
Nebraska 1923 88 Big XII  
Oklahoma 1923 88 Big XII  
Southern Cal 1923 88 PAC 12  
Ohio State 1922 89 Big 10  
UCLA 1922 89 PAC 12 shared w. Rose Bowl 
Vanderbilt 1922 89 SEC  
Kansas 1921 90 Big XII  
Tennessee 1921 90 SEC  
Oklahoma 
State 
1920 91 Big XII  
Washington 1920 91 PAC 12  
Wisconsin 1917 94 Big 10  
Cincinnati 1916 95 Big 
East 
 
Mississippi 1915 96 SEC  
Mississippi 
State 
1914 97 SEC  
Georgia Tech 1913 98 ACC  
NFL Average Stadium Age 23 
Average Year Opened 1988 
Automatic BCS Qualifier Average Stadium Age 65 
Average Year Opened 1946 
BCS Eligible Collegiate Average Stadium Age 56 
Average Year Opened 1955 
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Appendix 2 
Stadium Ages of Collegiate Bowl Games 
Collegiate Bowl Game Stadiums Updated 18 Sept. 2011 
 Age Year 
Opened 
Venue 
Cotton Bowl 2 2009 Cowboys Stadium 
Pinstripe Bowl 2 2009 Yankee Stadium 
Fiesta Bowl 5 2006 Arizona Cardinals home 
Texas Bowl 9 2002 Houston Texans home 
Little Caesars Pizza 
Bowl 
9 2002 Detroit Lions home 
Armed Forces Bowl 11 2000 SMU home, Ht Worth 
Kraft Fight Hunger 
Bowl 
11 2000 SF Giants home field 
Music City Bowl 12 1999 Tennessee Titans home 
Outback Bowl 13 1998 Tampa Bay Buccaneers home 
Belk Bowl 15 1996 Carolina Panthers home 
Alamo Bowl 18 1993 Alamo Dome, San Antonio 
Chick-fil-A Bowl 19 1992 Georgia Dome, Atlanta Falcons 
home 
Beef O‘Brady‘s Bowl 21 1990 Tampa Bay Rays home 
Orange Bowl 24 1987 Miami Dolphins & Marlins home 
Sugar Bowl 36 1975 New Orleans Saints home 
New Orleans Bowl 36 1975 New Orleans Saints home 
Hawai‘i Bowl 36 1975 Aloha Stadium, Honolulu 
Bowl Championship 
Game 
38.5 Average of Rose, Sugar, Orange & Fiesta 
Las Vegas Bowl 40 1971 UNLV Stadium, Las Vegas 
Famous Idaho Potato 
Bowl 
41 1970 Bronco Stadium 
Holiday Bowl 43 1968 San Diego Chargers home 
Poinsettia Bowl 43 1968 San Diego Chargers home 
Liberty Bowl 44 1967 Liberty Bowl Memorial, 
Memphis 
Sun Bowl 48 1963 Sun Bowl, El Paso 
Military Bowl 50 1961 RFK Stadium, DC 
New Mexico Bowl 51 1960 U of New Mexico home, 
Albuquerque 
Insight Bowl 53 1958 Sun Devil Stadium, Tempe 
GoDaddy Bowl 63 1948 Ladd Peebles Stadium, Mobile 
Gator Bowl 65 1946 Gator Bowl, Jacksonville Jaguars 
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home 
Capital One Bowl 75 1936 Citrus Bowl, Orlando 
Champs Sports Bowl 75 1936 Citrus Bowl, Orlando 
Ticket City Bowl 81 1930 Cotton Bowl, Dallas 
BBVA Compass Bowl 84 1927 Legion Field, Birmingham 
Independence Bowl 86 1925 Independence Bowl, Shreveport 
Rose Bowl 89 1922 Rose Bowl, Pasadena 
 
Average Bowl Stadium Age 39 
Average Year Opened 1972 
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